FEDERALIST PAPERS

(The Federalist Papers were a series of articles written under the pen name of Publius by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. Madison, widely recognized as the Father of the Constitution, would later go on to become President of the United States. Jay would become the first Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court. Hamilton would serve in the Cabinet and become a major force in setting economic policy for the US.

The entire purpose of The Federalist Papers was to gain popular support for the then-proposed Constitution. Some would call it the most significant public-relations campaign in history; it is, in fact, studied in many public relations classes as a prime example of how to conduct a successful campaign)

FEDERALIST. No. 1

General Introduction

For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficiency of the

 subsisting federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on

 a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject

 speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences

 nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare

 of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many

 respects the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently

 remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this

 country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important

 question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of

 establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether

 they are forever destined to depend for their political

 constitutions on accident and force. If there be any truth in the

 remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be

 regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a

 wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve

 to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.

This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of

 patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and

 good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice

 should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests,

 unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the

 public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than

 seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations

 affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local

 institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects

 foreign to its merits, and of views, passions and prejudices little

 favorable to the discovery of truth.

Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new

 Constitution will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the

 obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist

 all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument,

 and consequence of the offices they hold under the State

 establishments; and the perverted ambition of another class of men,

 who will either hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of

 their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of

 elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial

 confederacies than from its union under one government.

It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this

 nature. I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve

 indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because

 their situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or

 ambitious views. Candor will oblige us to admit that even such men

 may be actuated by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted

 that much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may

 hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless

 at least, if not respectable--the honest errors of minds led astray

 by preconceived jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so

 powerful are the causes which serve to give a false bias to the

 judgment, that we, upon many occasions, see wise and good men on the

 wrong as well as on the right side of questions of the first

 magnitude to society. This circumstance, if duly attended to, would

 furnish a lesson of moderation to those who are ever so much

 persuaded of their being in the right in any controversy. And a

 further reason for caution, in this respect, might be drawn from the

 reflection that we are not always sure that those who advocate the

 truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists.

 Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many

 other motives not more laudable than these, are apt to operate as

 well upon those who support as those who oppose the right side of a

 question. Were there not even these inducements to moderation,

 nothing could be more ill-judged than that intolerant spirit which

 has, at all times, characterized political parties. For in

 politics, as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making

 proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be

 cured by persecution.

And yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we

 have already sufficient indications that it will happen in this as

 in all former cases of great national discussion. A torrent of

 angry and malignant passions will be let loose. To judge from the

 conduct of the opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude that

 they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their opinions,

 and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of

 their declamations and the bitterness of their invectives. An

 enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be

 stigmatized as the offspring of a temper fond of despotic power and

 hostile to the principles of liberty. An over-scrupulous jealousy

 of danger to the rights of the people, which is more commonly the

 fault of the head than of the heart, will be represented as mere

 pretense and artifice, the stale bait for popularity at the expense

 of the public good. It will be forgotten, on the one hand, that

 jealousy is the usual concomitant of love, and that the noble

 enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow

 and illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equally

 forgotten that the vigor of government is essential to the security

 of liberty; that, in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed

 judgment, their interest can never be separated; and that a

 dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal

 for the rights of the people than under the forbidden appearance of

 zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government. History will

 teach us that the former has been found a much more certain road to

 the introduction of despotism than the latter, and that of those men

 who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number

 have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people;

 commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants.

In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an eye,

 my fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all

 attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a

 matter of the utmost moment to your welfare, by any impressions

 other than those which may result from the evidence of truth. You

 will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the general

 scope of them, that they proceed from a source not unfriendly to the

 new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I own to you that, after

 having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion

 it is your interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the

 safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I

 affect not reserves which I do not feel. I will not amuse you with

 an appearance of deliberation when I have decided. I frankly

 acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely lay before you

 the reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness of good

 intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not, however, multiply

 professions on this head. My motives must remain in the depository

 of my own breast. My arguments will be open to all, and may be

 judged of by all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which

 will not disgrace the cause of truth.

I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following

 interesting particulars:

THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR POLITICAL PROSPERITY

THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION

 TO PRESERVE THAT UNION  THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST

 EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED, TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS

 OBJECT  THE CONFORMITY OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION TO THE TRUE

 PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT

 ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR OWN STATE CONSTITUTION

 and lastly, THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY WHICH ITS

 ADOPTION WILL AFFORD TO THE PRESERVATION OF THAT SPECIES OF

 GOVERNMENT, TO LIBERTY, AND TO PROPERTY.

In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a

 satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made

 their appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention.

It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to

 prove the utility of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved

 on the hearts of the great body of the people in every State, and

 one, which it may be imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is,

 that we already hear it whispered in the private circles of those

 who oppose the new Constitution, that the thirteen States are of too

 great extent for any general system, and that we must of necessity

 resort to separate confederacies of distinct portions of the

 whole.1 This doctrine will, in all probability, be gradually

 propagated, till it has votaries enough to countenance an open

 avowal of it. For nothing can be more evident, to those who are

 able to take an enlarged view of the subject, than the alternative

 of an adoption of the new Constitution or a dismemberment of the

 Union. It will therefore be of use to begin by examining the

 advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the probable

 dangers, to which every State will be exposed from its dissolution.

 This shall accordingly constitute the subject of my next address.

 PUBLIUS.

1 The same idea, tracing the arguments to their consequences, is

 held out in several of the late publications against the new

 Constitution.

FEDERALIST No. 2

Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence

For the Independent Journal.

JAY

To the People of the State of New York:

WHEN the people of America reflect that they are now called upon

 to decide a question, which, in its consequences, must prove one of

 the most important that ever engaged their attention, the propriety

 of their taking a very comprehensive, as well as a very serious,

 view of it, will be evident.

Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of

 government, and it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however

 it is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural

 rights in order to vest it with requisite powers. It is well worthy

 of consideration therefore, whether it would conduce more to the

 interest of the people of America that they should, to all general

 purposes, be one nation, under one federal government, or that they

 should divide themselves into separate confederacies, and give to

 the head of each the same kind of powers which they are advised to

 place in one national government.

It has until lately been a received and uncontradicted opinion

 that the prosperity of the people of America depended on their

 continuing firmly united, and the wishes, prayers, and efforts of

 our best and wisest citizens have been constantly directed to that

 object. But politicians now appear, who insist that this opinion is

 erroneous, and that instead of looking for safety and happiness in

 union, we ought to seek it in a division of the States into distinct

 confederacies or sovereignties. However extraordinary this new

 doctrine may appear, it nevertheless has its advocates; and certain

 characters who were much opposed to it formerly, are at present of

 the number. Whatever may be the arguments or inducements which have

 wrought this change in the sentiments and declarations of these

 gentlemen, it certainly would not be wise in the people at large to

 adopt these new political tenets without being fully convinced that

 they are founded in truth and sound policy.

It has often given me pleasure to observe that independent

 America was not composed of detached and distant territories, but

 that one connected, fertile, widespreading country was the portion

 of our western sons of liberty. Providence has in a particular

 manner blessed it with a variety of soils and productions, and

 watered it with innumerable streams, for the delight and

 accommodation of its inhabitants. A succession of navigable waters

 forms a kind of chain round its borders, as if to bind it together;

 while the most noble rivers in the world, running at convenient

 distances, present them with highways for the easy communication of

 friendly aids, and the mutual transportation and exchange of their

 various commodities.

With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that Providence

 has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united

 people--a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same

 language, professing the same religion, attached to the same

 principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs,

 and who, by their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side

 by side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established

 general liberty and independence.

This country and this people seem to have been made for each

 other, and it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an

 inheritance so proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united

 to each other by the strongest ties, should never be split into a

 number of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties.

Similar sentiments have hitherto prevailed among all orders and

 denominations of men among us. To all general purposes we have

 uniformly been one people each individual citizen everywhere

 enjoying the same national rights, privileges, and protection. As a

 nation we have made peace and war; as a nation we have vanquished

 our common enemies; as a nation we have formed alliances, and made

 treaties, and entered into various compacts and conventions with

 foreign states.

A strong sense of the value and blessings of union induced the

 people, at a very early period, to institute a federal government to

 preserve and perpetuate it. They formed it almost as soon as they

 had a political existence; nay, at a time when their habitations

 were in flames, when many of their citizens were bleeding, and when

 the progress of hostility and desolation left little room for those

 calm and mature inquiries and reflections which must ever precede

 the formation of a wise and wellbalanced government for a free

 people. It is not to be wondered at, that a government instituted

 in times so inauspicious, should on experiment be found greatly

 deficient and inadequate to the purpose it was intended to answer.

This intelligent people perceived and regretted these defects.

 Still continuing no less attached to union than enamored of

 liberty, they observed the danger which immediately threatened the

 former and more remotely the latter; and being pursuaded that ample

 security for both could only be found in a national government more

 wisely framed, they as with one voice, convened the late convention

 at Philadelphia, to take that important subject under consideration.

This convention composed of men who possessed the confidence of

 the people, and many of whom had become highly distinguished by

 their patriotism, virtue and wisdom, in times which tried the minds

 and hearts of men, undertook the arduous task. In the mild season

 of peace, with minds unoccupied by other subjects, they passed many

 months in cool, uninterrupted, and daily consultation; and finally,

 without having been awed by power, or influenced by any passions

 except love for their country, they presented and recommended to the

 people the plan produced by their joint and very unanimous councils.

Admit, for so is the fact, that this plan is only RECOMMENDED,

 not imposed, yet let it be remembered that it is neither recommended

 to BLIND approbation, nor to BLIND reprobation; but to that sedate

 and candid consideration which the magnitude and importance of the

 subject demand, and which it certainly ought to receive. But this

 (as was remarked in the foregoing number of this paper) is more to

 be wished than expected, that it may be so considered and examined.

 Experience on a former occasion teaches us not to be too sanguine

 in such hopes. It is not yet forgotten that well-grounded

 apprehensions of imminent danger induced the people of America to

 form the memorable Congress of 1774. That body recommended certain

 measures to their constituents, and the event proved their wisdom;

 yet it is fresh in our memories how soon the press began to teem

 with pamphlets and weekly papers against those very measures. Not

 only many of the officers of government, who obeyed the dictates of

 personal interest, but others, from a mistaken estimate of

 consequences, or the undue influence of former attachments, or whose

 ambition aimed at objects which did not correspond with the public

 good, were indefatigable in their efforts to pursuade the people to

 reject the advice of that patriotic Congress. Many, indeed, were

 deceived and deluded, but the great majority of the people reasoned

 and decided judiciously; and happy they are in reflecting that they

 did so.

They considered that the Congress was composed of many wise and

 experienced men. That, being convened from different parts of the

 country, they brought with them and communicated to each other a

 variety of useful information. That, in the course of the time they

 passed together in inquiring into and discussing the true interests

 of their country, they must have acquired very accurate knowledge on

 that head. That they were individually interested in the public

 liberty and prosperity, and therefore that it was not less their

 inclination than their duty to recommend only such measures as,

 after the most mature deliberation, they really thought prudent and

 advisable.

These and similar considerations then induced the people to rely

 greatly on the judgment and integrity of the Congress; and they

 took their advice, notwithstanding the various arts and endeavors

 used to deter them from it. But if the people at large had reason

 to confide in the men of that Congress, few of whom had been fully

 tried or generally known, still greater reason have they now to

 respect the judgment and advice of the convention, for it is well

 known that some of the most distinguished members of that Congress,

 who have been since tried and justly approved for patriotism and

 abilities, and who have grown old in acquiring political

 information, were also members of this convention, and carried into

 it their accumulated knowledge and experience.

It is worthy of remark that not only the first, but every

 succeeding Congress, as well as the late convention, have invariably

 joined with the people in thinking that the prosperity of America

 depended on its Union. To preserve and perpetuate it was the great

 object of the people in forming that convention, and it is also the

 great object of the plan which the convention has advised them to

 adopt. With what propriety, therefore, or for what good purposes,

 are attempts at this particular period made by some men to

 depreciate the importance of the Union? Or why is it suggested that

 three or four confederacies would be better than one? I am

 persuaded in my own mind that the people have always thought right

 on this subject, and that their universal and uniform attachment to

 the cause of the Union rests on great and weighty reasons, which I

 shall endeavor to develop and explain in some ensuing papers. They

 who promote the idea of substituting a number of distinct

 confederacies in the room of the plan of the convention, seem

 clearly to foresee that the rejection of it would put the

 continuance of the Union in the utmost jeopardy. That certainly

 would be the case, and I sincerely wish that it may be as clearly

 foreseen by every good citizen, that whenever the dissolution of the

 Union arrives, America will have reason to exclaim, in the words of

 the poet: ``FAREWELL! A LONG FAREWELL TO ALL MY GREATNESS.''

PUBLIUS.

FEDERALIST No. 3

The Same Subject Continued

(Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)

For the Independent Journal.

JAY

To the People of the State of New York:

IT IS not a new observation that the people of any country (if,

 like the Americans, intelligent and wellinformed) seldom adopt and

 steadily persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting

 their interests. That consideration naturally tends to create great

 respect for the high opinion which the people of America have so

 long and uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing

 firmly united under one federal government, vested with sufficient

 powers for all general and national purposes.

The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons

 which appear to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become

 convinced that they are cogent and conclusive.

Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it

 necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their

 SAFETY seems to be the first. The SAFETY of the people doubtless

 has relation to a great variety of circumstances and considerations,

 and consequently affords great latitude to those who wish to define

 it precisely and comprehensively.

At present I mean only to consider it as it respects security

 for the preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well as against

 dangers from FOREIGN ARMS AND INFLUENCE, as from dangers of the LIKE

 KIND arising from domestic causes. As the former of these comes

 first in order, it is proper it should be the first discussed. Let

 us therefore proceed to examine whether the people are not right in

 their opinion that a cordial Union, under an efficient national

 government, affords them the best security that can be devised

 against HOSTILITIES from abroad.

The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the

 world will always be found to be in proportion to the number and

 weight of the causes, whether REAL or PRETENDED, which PROVOKE or

 INVITE them. If this remark be just, it becomes useful to inquire

 whether so many JUST causes of war are likely to be given by UNITED

 AMERICA as by DISUNITED America; for if it should turn out that

 United America will probably give the fewest, then it will follow

 that in this respect the Union tends most to preserve the people in

 a state of peace with other nations.

The JUST causes of war, for the most part, arise either from

 violation of treaties or from direct violence. America has already

 formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations, and all of

 them, except Prussia, are maritime, and therefore able to annoy and

 injure us. She has also extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain,

 and Britain, and, with respect to the two latter, has, in addition,

 the circumstance of neighborhood to attend to.

It is of high importance to the peace of America that she

 observe the laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it

 appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done

 by one national government than it could be either by thirteen

 separate States or by three or four distinct confederacies.

Because when once an efficient national government is

 established, the best men in the country will not only consent to

 serve, but also will generally be appointed to manage it; for,

 although town or country, or other contracted influence, may place

 men in State assemblies, or senates, or courts of justice, or

 executive departments, yet more general and extensive reputation for

 talents and other qualifications will be necessary to recommend men

 to offices under the national government,--especially as it will have

 the widest field for choice, and never experience that want of

 proper persons which is not uncommon in some of the States. Hence,

 it will result that the administration, the political counsels, and

 the judicial decisions of the national government will be more wise,

 systematical, and judicious than those of individual States, and

 consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as

 well as more SAFE with respect to us.

Because, under the national government, treaties and articles of

 treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded

 in one sense and executed in the same manner,--whereas, adjudications

 on the same points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or

 four confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent; and

 that, as well from the variety of independent courts and judges

 appointed by different and independent governments, as from the

 different local laws and interests which may affect and influence

 them. The wisdom of the convention, in committing such questions to

 the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by and responsible

 only to one national government, cannot be too much commended.

Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often

 tempt the governing party in one or two States to swerve from good

 faith and justice; but those temptations, not reaching the other

 States, and consequently having little or no influence on the

 national government, the temptation will be fruitless, and good

 faith and justice be preserved. The case of the treaty of peace

 with Britain adds great weight to this reasoning.

Because, even if the governing party in a State should be

 disposed to resist such temptations, yet as such temptations may,

 and commonly do, result from circumstances peculiar to the State,

 and may affect a great number of the inhabitants, the governing

 party may not always be able, if willing, to prevent the injustice

 meditated, or to punish the aggressors. But the national

 government, not being affected by those local circumstances, will

 neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves, nor want power or

 inclination to prevent or punish its commission by others.

So far, therefore, as either designed or accidental violations

 of treaties and the laws of nations afford JUST causes of war, they

 are less to be apprehended under one general government than under

 several lesser ones, and in that respect the former most favors the

 SAFETY of the people.

As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and

 unlawful violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good

 national government affords vastly more security against dangers of

 that sort than can be derived from any other quarter.

Because such violences are more frequently caused by the

 passions and interests of a part than of the whole; of one or two

 States than of the Union. Not a single Indian war has yet been

 occasioned by aggressions of the present federal government, feeble

 as it is; but there are several instances of Indian hostilities

 having been provoked by the improper conduct of individual States,

 who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offenses, have

 given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants.

The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering

 on some States and not on others, naturally confines the causes of

 quarrel more immediately to the borderers. The bordering States, if

 any, will be those who, under the impulse of sudden irritation, and

 a quick sense of apparent interest or injury, will be most likely,

 by direct violence, to excite war with these nations; and nothing

 can so effectually obviate that danger as a national government,

 whose wisdom and prudence will not be diminished by the passions

 which actuate the parties immediately interested.

But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the

 national government, but it will also be more in their power to

 accommodate and settle them amicably. They will be more temperate

 and cool, and in that respect, as well as in others, will be more in

 capacity to act advisedly than the offending State. The pride of

 states, as well as of men, naturally disposes them to justify all

 their actions, and opposes their acknowledging, correcting, or

 repairing their errors and offenses. The national government, in

 such cases, will not be affected by this pride, but will proceed

 with moderation and candor to consider and decide on the means most

 proper to extricate them from the difficulties which threaten them.

Besides, it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations,

 and compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong

 united nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered

 by a State or confederacy of little consideration or power.

In the year 1685, the state of Genoa having offended Louis XIV.,

 endeavored to appease him. He demanded that they should send their

 Doge, or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their

 senators, to FRANCE, to ask his pardon and receive his terms. They

 were obliged to submit to it for the sake of peace. Would he on any

 occasion either have demanded or have received the like humiliation

 from Spain, or Britain, or any other POWERFUL nation?

PUBLIUS.

FEDERALIST No. 4

The Same Subject Continued

(Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)

For the Independent Journal.

JAY

To the People of the State of New York:

MY LAST paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the

 people would be best secured by union against the danger it may be

 exposed to by JUST causes of war given to other nations; and those

 reasons show that such causes would not only be more rarely given,

 but would also be more easily accommodated, by a national government

 than either by the State governments or the proposed little

 confederacies.

But the safety of the people of America against dangers from

 FOREIGN force depends not only on their forbearing to give JUST

 causes of war to other nations, but also on their placing and

 continuing themselves in such a situation as not to INVITE hostility

 or insult; for it need not be observed that there are PRETENDED as

 well as just causes of war.

It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature,

 that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect

 of getting anything by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make

 war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for the

 purposes and objects merely personal, such as thirst for military

 glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts

 to aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans.

 These and a variety of other motives, which affect only the mind of

 the sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by

 justice or the voice and interests of his people. But, independent

 of these inducements to war, which are more prevalent in absolute

 monarchies, but which well deserve our attention, there are others

 which affect nations as often as kings; and some of them will on

 examination be found to grow out of our relative situation and

 circumstances.

With France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheries, and

 can supply their markets cheaper than they can themselves,

 notwithstanding any efforts to prevent it by bounties on their own

 or duties on foreign fish.

With them and with most other European nations we are rivals in

 navigation and the carrying trade; and we shall deceive ourselves

 if we suppose that any of them will rejoice to see it flourish;

 for, as our carrying trade cannot increase without in some degree

 diminishing theirs, it is more their interest, and will be more

 their policy, to restrain than to promote it.

In the trade to China and India, we interfere with more than one

 nation, inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages which

 they had in a manner monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves

 with commodities which we used to purchase from them.

The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give

 pleasure to any nations who possess territories on or near this

 continent, because the cheapness and excellence of our productions,

 added to the circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and

 address of our merchants and navigators, will give us a greater

 share in the advantages which those territories afford, than

 consists with the wishes or policy of their respective sovereigns.

Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on

 the one side, and Britain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the

 other; nor will either of them permit the other waters which are

 between them and us to become the means of mutual intercourse and

 traffic.

From these and such like considerations, which might, if

 consistent with prudence, be more amplified and detailed, it is easy

 to see that jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the

 minds and cabinets of other nations, and that we are not to expect

 that they should regard our advancement in union, in power and

 consequence by land and by sea, with an eye of indifference and

 composure.

The people of America are aware that inducements to war may

 arise out of these circumstances, as well as from others not so

 obvious at present, and that whenever such inducements may find fit

 time and opportunity for operation, pretenses to color and justify

 them will not be wanting. Wisely, therefore, do they consider union

 and a good national government as necessary to put and keep them in

 SUCH A SITUATION as, instead of INVITING war, will tend to repress

 and discourage it. That situation consists in the best possible

 state of defense, and necessarily depends on the government, the

 arms, and the resources of the country.

As the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and

 cannot be provided for without government, either one or more or

 many, let us inquire whether one good government is not, relative to

 the object in question, more competent than any other given number

 whatever.

One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and

 experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may

 be found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can

 harmonize, assimilate, and protect the several parts and members,

 and extend the benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. In

 the formation of treaties, it will regard the interest of the whole,

 and the particular interests of the parts as connected with that of

 the whole. It can apply the resources and power of the whole to the

 defense of any particular part, and that more easily and

 expeditiously than State governments or separate confederacies can

 possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system. It can place

 the militia under one plan of discipline, and, by putting their

 officers in a proper line of subordination to the Chief Magistrate,

 will, as it were, consolidate them into one corps, and thereby

 render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen or into

 three or four distinct independent companies.

What would the militia of Britain be if the English militia

 obeyed the government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the

 government of Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the

 government of Wales? Suppose an invasion; would those three

 governments (if they agreed at all) be able, with all their

 respective forces, to operate against the enemy so effectually as

 the single government of Great Britain would?

We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the time may

 come, if we are wise, when the fleets of America may engage

 attention. But if one national government, had not so regulated the

 navigation of Britain as to make it a nursery for seamen--if one

 national government had not called forth all the national means and

 materials for forming fleets, their prowess and their thunder would

 never have been celebrated. Let England have its navigation and

 fleet--let Scotland have its navigation and fleet--let Wales have its

 navigation and fleet--let Ireland have its navigation and fleet--let

 those four of the constituent parts of the British empire be be

 under four independent governments, and it is easy to perceive how

 soon they would each dwindle into comparative insignificance.

Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America divided into

 thirteen or, if you please, into three or four independent

 governments--what armies could they raise and pay--what fleets could

 they ever hope to have? If one was attacked, would the others fly

 to its succor, and spend their blood and money in its defense?

 Would there be no danger of their being flattered into neutrality

 by its specious promises, or seduced by a too great fondness for

 peace to decline hazarding their tranquillity and present safety for

 the sake of neighbors, of whom perhaps they have been jealous, and

 whose importance they are content to see diminished? Although such

 conduct would not be wise, it would, nevertheless, be natural. The

 history of the states of Greece, and of other countries, abounds

 with such instances, and it is not improbable that what has so often

 happened would, under similar circumstances, happen again.

But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded State

 or confederacy. How, and when, and in what proportion shall aids of

 men and money be afforded? Who shall command the allied armies, and

 from which of them shall he receive his orders? Who shall settle

 the terms of peace, and in case of disputes what umpire shall decide

 between them and compel acquiescence? Various difficulties and

 inconveniences would be inseparable from such a situation; whereas

 one government, watching over the general and common interests, and

 combining and directing the powers and resources of the whole, would

 be free from all these embarrassments, and conduce far more to the

 safety of the people.

But whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under

 one national government, or split into a number of confederacies,

 certain it is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as

 it is; and they will act toward us accordingly. If they see that

 our national government is efficient and well administered, our

 trade prudently regulated, our militia properly organized and

 disciplined, our resources and finances discreetly managed, our

 credit re-established, our people free, contented, and united, they

 will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke

 our resentment. If, on the other hand, they find us either

 destitute of an effectual government (each State doing right or

 wrong, as to its rulers may seem convenient), or split into three or

 four independent and probably discordant republics or confederacies,

 one inclining to Britain, another to France, and a third to Spain,

 and perhaps played off against each other by the three, what a poor,

 pitiful figure will America make in their eyes! How liable would

 she become not only to their contempt but to their outrage, and how

 soon would dear-bought experience proclaim that when a people or

 family so divide, it never fails to be against themselves.

PUBLIUS.

FEDERALIST No. 5

The Same Subject Continued

(Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)

For the Independent Journal.

JAY

To the People of the State of New York:

QUEEN ANNE, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch

 Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the UNION

 then forming between England and Scotland, which merit our attention.

 I shall present the public with one or two extracts from it: ``An

 entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting

 peace: It will secure your religion, liberty, and property; remove

 the animosities amongst yourselves, and the jealousies and

 differences betwixt our two kingdoms. It must increase your

 strength, riches, and trade; and by this union the whole island,

 being joined in affection and free from all apprehensions of

 different interest, will be ENABLED TO RESIST ALL ITS ENEMIES.''

 ``We most earnestly recommend to you calmness and unanimity in this

 great and weighty affair, that the union may be brought to a happy

 conclusion, being the only EFFECTUAL way to secure our present and

 future happiness, and disappoint the designs of our and your

 enemies, who will doubtless, on this occasion, USE THEIR UTMOST

 ENDEAVORS TO PREVENT OR DELAY THIS UNION.''

It was remarked in the preceding paper, that weakness and

 divisions at home would invite dangers from abroad; and that

 nothing would tend more to secure us from them than union, strength,

 and good government within ourselves. This subject is copious and

 cannot easily be exhausted.

The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in

 general the best acquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons.

 We may profit by their experience without paying the price which it

 cost them. Although it seems obvious to common sense that the

 people of such an island should be but one nation, yet we find that

 they were for ages divided into three, and that those three were

 almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars with one another.

 Notwithstanding their true interest with respect to the continental

 nations was really the same, yet by the arts and policy and

 practices of those nations, their mutual jealousies were perpetually

 kept inflamed, and for a long series of years they were far more

 inconvenient and troublesome than they were useful and assisting to

 each other.

Should the people of America divide themselves into three or

 four nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not similar

 jealousies arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of their

 being ``joined in affection'' and free from all apprehension of

 different ``interests,'' envy and jealousy would soon extinguish

 confidence and affection, and the partial interests of each

 confederacy, instead of the general interests of all America, would

 be the only objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence, like most

 other BORDERING nations, they would always be either involved in

 disputes and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them.

The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies

 cannot reasonably suppose that they would long remain exactly on an

 equal footing in point of strength, even if it was possible to form

 them so at first; but, admitting that to be practicable, yet what

 human contrivance can secure the continuance of such equality?

 Independent of those local circumstances which tend to beget and

 increase power in one part and to impede its progress in another, we

 must advert to the effects of that superior policy and good

 management which would probably distinguish the government of one

 above the rest, and by which their relative equality in strength and

 consideration would be destroyed. For it cannot be presumed that

 the same degree of sound policy, prudence, and foresight would

 uniformly be observed by each of these confederacies for a long

 succession of years.

Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen

 it would, that any one of these nations or confederacies should rise

 on the scale of political importance much above the degree of her

 neighbors, that moment would those neighbors behold her with envy

 and with fear. Both those passions would lead them to countenance,

 if not to promote, whatever might promise to diminish her

 importance; and would also restrain them from measures calculated

 to advance or even to secure her prosperity. Much time would not be

 necessary to enable her to discern these unfriendly dispositions.

 She would soon begin, not only to lose confidence in her neighbors,

 but also to feel a disposition equally unfavorable to them.

 Distrust naturally creates distrust, and by nothing is good-will

 and kind conduct more speedily changed than by invidious jealousies

 and uncandid imputations, whether expressed or implied.

The North is generally the region of strength, and many local

 circumstances render it probable that the most Northern of the

 proposed confederacies would, at a period not very distant, be

 unquestionably more formidable than any of the others. No sooner

 would this become evident than the NORTHERN HIVE would excite the

 same ideas and sensations in the more southern parts of America

 which it formerly did in the southern parts of Europe. Nor does it

 appear to be a rash conjecture that its young swarms might often be

 tempted to gather honey in the more blooming fields and milder air

 of their luxurious and more delicate neighbors.

They who well consider the history of similar divisions and

 confederacies will find abundant reason to apprehend that those in

 contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors than as they

 would be borderers; that they would neither love nor trust one

 another, but on the contrary would be a prey to discord, jealousy,

 and mutual injuries; in short, that they would place us exactly in

 the situations in which some nations doubtless wish to see us, viz.,

 FORMIDABLE ONLY TO EACH OTHER.

From these considerations it appears that those gentlemen are

 greatly mistaken who suppose that alliances offensive and defensive

 might be formed between these confederacies, and would produce that

 combination and union of wills of arms and of resources, which would

 be necessary to put and keep them in a formidable state of defense

 against foreign enemies.

When did the independent states, into which Britain and Spain

 were formerly divided, combine in such alliance, or unite their

 forces against a foreign enemy? The proposed confederacies will be

 DISTINCT NATIONS. Each of them would have its commerce with

 foreigners to regulate by distinct treaties; and as their

 productions and commodities are different and proper for different

 markets, so would those treaties be essentially different.

 Different commercial concerns must create different interests, and

 of course different degrees of political attachment to and

 connection with different foreign nations. Hence it might and

 probably would happen that the foreign nation with whom the SOUTHERN

 confederacy might be at war would be the one with whom the NORTHERN

 confederacy would be the most desirous of preserving peace and

 friendship. An alliance so contrary to their immediate interest

 would not therefore be easy to form, nor, if formed, would it be

 observed and fulfilled with perfect good faith.

Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe,

 neighboring nations, acting under the impulse of opposite interests

 and unfriendly passions, would frequently be found taking different

 sides. Considering our distance from Europe, it would be more

 natural for these confederacies to apprehend danger from one another

 than from distant nations, and therefore that each of them should be

 more desirous to guard against the others by the aid of foreign

 alliances, than to guard against foreign dangers by alliances

 between themselves. And here let us not forget how much more easy

 it is to receive foreign fleets into our ports, and foreign armies

 into our country, than it is to persuade or compel them to depart.

 How many conquests did the Romans and others make in the characters

 of allies, and what innovations did they under the same character

 introduce into the governments of those whom they pretended to

 protect.

Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of America into

 any given number of independent sovereignties would tend to secure

 us against the hostilities and improper interference of foreign

 nations.

PUBLIUS.

FEDERALIST No. 6

Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States

For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE three last numbers of this paper have been dedicated to an

 enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed, in a state

 of disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations. I shall now

 proceed to delineate dangers of a different and, perhaps, still more

 alarming kind--those which will in all probability flow from

 dissensions between the States themselves, and from domestic

 factions and convulsions. These have been already in some instances

 slightly anticipated; but they deserve a more particular and more

 full investigation.

A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously

 doubt that, if these States should either be wholly disunited, or

 only united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which

 they might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests with

 each other. To presume a want of motives for such contests as an

 argument against their existence, would be to forget that men are

 ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious. To look for a continuation of

 harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties

 in the same neighborhood, would be to disregard the uniform course

 of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience

 of ages.

The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable. There

 are some which have a general and almost constant operation upon the

 collective bodies of society. Of this description are the love of

 power or the desire of pre-eminence and dominion--the jealousy of

 power, or the desire of equality and safety. There are others which

 have a more circumscribed though an equally operative influence

 within their spheres. Such are the rivalships and competitions of

 commerce between commercial nations. And there are others, not less

 numerous than either of the former, which take their origin entirely

 in private passions; in the attachments, enmities, interests,

 hopes, and fears of leading individuals in the communities of which

 they are members. Men of this class, whether the favorites of a

 king or of a people, have in too many instances abused the

 confidence they possessed; and assuming the pretext of some public

 motive, have not scrupled to sacrifice the national tranquillity to

 personal advantage or personal gratification.

The celebrated Pericles, in compliance with the resentment of a

 prostitute,1 at the expense of much of the blood and treasure of

 his countrymen, attacked, vanquished, and destroyed the city of the

 SAMNIANS. The same man, stimulated by private pique against the

 MEGARENSIANS,2 another nation of Greece, or to avoid a

 prosecution with which he was threatened as an accomplice of a

 supposed theft of the statuary Phidias,3 or to get rid of the

 accusations prepared to be brought against him for dissipating the

 funds of the state in the purchase of popularity,4 or from a

 combination of all these causes, was the primitive author of that

 famous and fatal war, distinguished in the Grecian annals by the

 name of the PELOPONNESIAN war; which, after various vicissitudes,

 intermissions, and renewals, terminated in the ruin of the Athenian

 commonwealth.

The ambitious cardinal, who was prime minister to Henry VIII.,

 permitting his vanity to aspire to the triple crown,5

 entertained hopes of succeeding in the acquisition of that splendid

 prize by the influence of the Emperor Charles V. To secure the

 favor and interest of this enterprising and powerful monarch, he

 precipitated England into a war with France, contrary to the

 plainest dictates of policy, and at the hazard of the safety and

 independence, as well of the kingdom over which he presided by his

 counsels, as of Europe in general. For if there ever was a

 sovereign who bid fair to realize the project of universal monarchy,

 it was the Emperor Charles V., of whose intrigues Wolsey was at once

 the instrument and the dupe.

The influence which the bigotry of one female,6 the

 petulance of another,7 and the cabals of a third,8 had in

 the contemporary policy, ferments, and pacifications, of a

 considerable part of Europe, are topics that have been too often

 descanted upon not to be generally known.

To multiply examples of the agency of personal considerations in

 the production of great national events, either foreign or domestic,

 according to their direction, would be an unnecessary waste of time.

 Those who have but a superficial acquaintance with the sources from

 which they are to be drawn, will themselves recollect a variety of

 instances; and those who have a tolerable knowledge of human nature

 will not stand in need of such lights to form their opinion either

 of the reality or extent of that agency. Perhaps, however, a

 reference, tending to illustrate the general principle, may with

 propriety be made to a case which has lately happened among

 ourselves. If Shays had not been a DESPERATE DEBTOR, it is much to

 be doubted whether Massachusetts would have been plunged into a

 civil war.

But notwithstanding the concurring testimony of experience, in

 this particular, there are still to be found visionary or designing

 men, who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace

 between the States, though dismembered and alienated from each other.

 The genius of republics (say they) is pacific; the spirit of

 commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of men, and to

 extinguish those inflammable humors which have so often kindled into

 wars. Commercial republics, like ours, will never be disposed to

 waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other. They will

 be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of

 mutual amity and concord.

Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics) the true

 interest of all nations to cultivate the same benevolent and

 philosophic spirit? If this be their true interest, have they in

 fact pursued it? Has it not, on the contrary, invariably been found

 that momentary passions, and immediate interest, have a more active

 and imperious control over human conduct than general or remote

 considerations of policy, utility or justice? Have republics in

 practice been less addicted to war than monarchies? Are not the

 former administered by MEN as well as the latter? Are there not

 aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust

 acquisitions, that affect nations as well as kings? Are not popular

 assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment,

 jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities?

 Is it not well known that their determinations are often governed

 by a few individuals in whom they place confidence, and are, of

 course, liable to be tinctured by the passions and views of those

 individuals? Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change

 the objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and

 enterprising a passion as that of power or glory? Have there not

 been as many wars founded upon commercial motives since that has

 become the prevailing system of nations, as were before occasioned

 by the cupidity of territory or dominion? Has not the spirit of

 commerce, in many instances, administered new incentives to the

 appetite, both for the one and for the other? Let experience, the

 least fallible guide of human opinions, be appealed to for an answer

 to these inquiries.

Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics; two of

 them, Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind. Yet were they as

 often engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the neighboring

 monarchies of the same times. Sparta was little better than a

 wellregulated camp; and Rome was never sated of carnage and

 conquest.

Carthage, though a commercial republic, was the aggressor in the

 very war that ended in her destruction. Hannibal had carried her

 arms into the heart of Italy and to the gates of Rome, before

 Scipio, in turn, gave him an overthrow in the territories of

 Carthage, and made a conquest of the commonwealth.

Venice, in later times, figured more than once in wars of

 ambition, till, becoming an object to the other Italian states, Pope

 Julius II. found means to accomplish that formidable league,9

 which gave a deadly blow to the power and pride of this haughty

 republic.

The provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed in debts

 and taxes, took a leading and conspicuous part in the wars of Europe.

 They had furious contests with England for the dominion of the

 sea, and were among the most persevering and most implacable of the

 opponents of Louis XIV.

In the government of Britain the representatives of the people

 compose one branch of the national legislature. Commerce has been

 for ages the predominant pursuit of that country. Few nations,

 nevertheless, have been more frequently engaged in war; and the

 wars in which that kingdom has been engaged have, in numerous

 instances, proceeded from the people.

There have been, if I may so express it, almost as many popular

 as royal wars. The cries of the nation and the importunities of

 their representatives have, upon various occasions, dragged their

 monarchs into war, or continued them in it, contrary to their

 inclinations, and sometimes contrary to the real interests of the

 State. In that memorable struggle for superiority between the rival

 houses of AUSTRIA and BOURBON, which so long kept Europe in a flame,

 it is well known that the antipathies of the English against the

 French, seconding the ambition, or rather the avarice, of a favorite

 leader,10 protracted the war beyond the limits marked out by

 sound policy, and for a considerable time in opposition to the views

 of the court.

The wars of these two last-mentioned nations have in a great

 measure grown out of commercial considerations,--the desire of

 supplanting and the fear of being supplanted, either in particular

 branches of traffic or in the general advantages of trade and

 navigation.

From this summary of what has taken place in other countries,

 whose situations have borne the nearest resemblance to our own, what

 reason can we have to confide in those reveries which would seduce

 us into an expectation of peace and cordiality between the members

 of the present confederacy, in a state of separation? Have we not

 already seen enough of the fallacy and extravagance of those idle

 theories which have amused us with promises of an exemption from the

 imperfections, weaknesses and evils incident to society in every

 shape? Is it not time to awake from the deceitful dream of a golden

 age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our

 political conduct that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the

 globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and

 perfect virtue?

Let the point of extreme depression to which our national

 dignity and credit have sunk, let the inconveniences felt everywhere

 from a lax and ill administration of government, let the revolt of a

 part of the State of North Carolina, the late menacing disturbances

 in Pennsylvania, and the actual insurrections and rebellions in

 Massachusetts, declare--!

So far is the general sense of mankind from corresponding with

 the tenets of those who endeavor to lull asleep our apprehensions of

 discord and hostility between the States, in the event of disunion,

 that it has from long observation of the progress of society become

 a sort of axiom in politics, that vicinity or nearness of situation,

 constitutes nations natural enemies. An intelligent writer

 expresses himself on this subject to this effect: ``NEIGHBORING

 NATIONS (says he) are naturally enemies of each other unless their

 common weakness forces them to league in a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC, and

 their constitution prevents the differences that neighborhood

 occasions, extinguishing that secret jealousy which disposes all

 states to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their

 neighbors.''11 This passage, at the same time, points out the

 EVIL and suggests the REMEDY.

PUBLIUS.

1 Aspasia, vide ``Plutarch's Life of Pericles.''

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 ] Ibid. Phidias was supposed to have stolen some public

 gold, with the connivance of Pericles, for the embellishment of the

 statue of Minerva.

5 P Worn by the popes.

6 Madame de Maintenon.

7 Duchess of Marlborough.

8 Madame de Pompadour.

9 The League of Cambray, comprehending the Emperor, the King of

 France, the King of Aragon, and most of the Italian princes and

 states.

10 The Duke of Marlborough.

11 Vide ``Principes des Negociations'' par 1'Abbe de Mably.

FEDERALIST. No. 7

The Same Subject Continued

(Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States)

For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

IT IS sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what

 inducements could the States have, if disunited, to make war upon

 each other? It would be a full answer to this question to

 say--precisely the same inducements which have, at different times,

 deluged in blood all the nations in the world. But, unfortunately

 for us, the question admits of a more particular answer. There are

 causes of differences within our immediate contemplation, of the

 tendency of which, even under the restraints of a federal

 constitution, we have had sufficient experience to enable us to form

 a judgment of what might be expected if those restraints were

 removed.

Territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the

 most fertile sources of hostility among nations. Perhaps the

 greatest proportion of wars that have desolated the earth have

 sprung from this origin. This cause would exist among us in full

 force. We have a vast tract of unsettled territory within the

 boundaries of the United States. There still are discordant and

 undecided claims between several of them, and the dissolution of the

 Union would lay a foundation for similar claims between them all.

 It is well known that they have heretofore had serious and animated

 discussion concerning the rights to the lands which were ungranted

 at the time of the Revolution, and which usually went under the name

 of crown lands. The States within the limits of whose colonial

 governments they were comprised have claimed them as their property,

 the others have contended that the rights of the crown in this

 article devolved upon the Union; especially as to all that part of

 the Western territory which, either by actual possession, or through

 the submission of the Indian proprietors, was subjected to the

 jurisdiction of the king of Great Britain, till it was relinquished

 in the treaty of peace. This, it has been said, was at all events

 an acquisition to the Confederacy by compact with a foreign power.

 It has been the prudent policy of Congress to appease this

 controversy, by prevailing upon the States to make cessions to the

 United States for the benefit of the whole. This has been so far

 accomplished as, under a continuation of the Union, to afford a

 decided prospect of an amicable termination of the dispute. A

 dismemberment of the Confederacy, however, would revive this

 dispute, and would create others on the same subject. At present, a

 large part of the vacant Western territory is, by cession at least,

 if not by any anterior right, the common property of the Union. If

 that were at an end, the States which made the cession, on a

 principle of federal compromise, would be apt when the motive of the

 grant had ceased, to reclaim the lands as a reversion. The other

 States would no doubt insist on a proportion, by right of

 representation. Their argument would be, that a grant, once made,

 could not be revoked; and that the justice of participating in

 territory acquired or secured by the joint efforts of the

 Confederacy, remained undiminished. If, contrary to probability, it

 should be admitted by all the States, that each had a right to a

 share of this common stock, there would still be a difficulty to be

 surmounted, as to a proper rule of apportionment. Different

 principles would be set up by different States for this purpose;

 and as they would affect the opposite interests of the parties,

 they might not easily be susceptible of a pacific adjustment.

In the wide field of Western territory, therefore, we perceive

 an ample theatre for hostile pretensions, without any umpire or

 common judge to interpose between the contending parties. To reason

 from the past to the future, we shall have good ground to apprehend,

 that the sword would sometimes be appealed to as the arbiter of

 their differences. The circumstances of the dispute between

 Connecticut and Pennsylvania, respecting the land at Wyoming,

 admonish us not to be sanguine in expecting an easy accommodation of

 such differences. The articles of confederation obliged the parties

 to submit the matter to the decision of a federal court. The

 submission was made, and the court decided in favor of Pennsylvania.

 But Connecticut gave strong indications of dissatisfaction with

 that determination; nor did she appear to be entirely resigned to

 it, till, by negotiation and management, something like an

 equivalent was found for the loss she supposed herself to have

 sustained. Nothing here said is intended to convey the slightest

 censure on the conduct of that State. She no doubt sincerely

 believed herself to have been injured by the decision; and States,

 like individuals, acquiesce with great reluctance in determinations

 to their disadvantage.

Those who had an opportunity of seeing the inside of the

 transactions which attended the progress of the controversy between

 this State and the district of Vermont, can vouch the opposition we

 experienced, as well from States not interested as from those which

 were interested in the claim; and can attest the danger to which

 the peace of the Confederacy might have been exposed, had this State

 attempted to assert its rights by force. Two motives preponderated

 in that opposition: one, a jealousy entertained of our future

 power; and the other, the interest of certain individuals of

 influence in the neighboring States, who had obtained grants of

 lands under the actual government of that district. Even the States

 which brought forward claims, in contradiction to ours, seemed more

 solicitous to dismember this State, than to establish their own

 pretensions. These were New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and

 Connecticut. New Jersey and Rhode Island, upon all occasions,

 discovered a warm zeal for the independence of Vermont; and

 Maryland, till alarmed by the appearance of a connection between

 Canada and that State, entered deeply into the same views. These

 being small States, saw with an unfriendly eye the perspective of

 our growing greatness. In a review of these transactions we may

 trace some of the causes which would be likely to embroil the States

 with each other, if it should be their unpropitious destiny to

 become disunited.

The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of

 contention. The States less favorably circumstanced would be

 desirous of escaping from the disadvantages of local situation, and

 of sharing in the advantages of their more fortunate neighbors.

 Each State, or separate confederacy, would pursue a system of

 commercial policy peculiar to itself. This would occasion

 distinctions, preferences, and exclusions, which would beget

 discontent. The habits of intercourse, on the basis of equal

 privileges, to which we have been accustomed since the earliest

 settlement of the country, would give a keener edge to those causes

 of discontent than they would naturally have independent of this

 circumstance. WE SHOULD BE READY TO DENOMINATE INJURIES THOSE

 THINGS WHICH WERE IN REALITY THE JUSTIFIABLE ACTS OF INDEPENDENT

 SOVEREIGNTIES CONSULTING A DISTINCT INTEREST. The spirit of

 enterprise, which characterizes the commercial part of America, has

 left no occasion of displaying itself unimproved. It is not at all

 probable that this unbridled spirit would pay much respect to those

 regulations of trade by which particular States might endeavor to

 secure exclusive benefits to their own citizens. The infractions of

 these regulations, on one side, the efforts to prevent and repel

 them, on the other, would naturally lead to outrages, and these to

 reprisals and wars.

The opportunities which some States would have of rendering

 others tributary to them by commercial regulations would be

 impatiently submitted to by the tributary States. The relative

 situation of New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey would afford an

 example of this kind. New York, from the necessities of revenue,

 must lay duties on her importations. A great part of these duties

 must be paid by the inhabitants of the two other States in the

 capacity of consumers of what we import. New York would neither be

 willing nor able to forego this advantage. Her citizens would not

 consent that a duty paid by them should be remitted in favor of the

 citizens of her neighbors; nor would it be practicable, if there

 were not this impediment in the way, to distinguish the customers in

 our own markets. Would Connecticut and New Jersey long submit to be

 taxed by New York for her exclusive benefit? Should we be long

 permitted to remain in the quiet and undisturbed enjoyment of a

 metropolis, from the possession of which we derived an advantage so

 odious to our neighbors, and, in their opinion, so oppressive?

 Should we be able to preserve it against the incumbent weight of

 Connecticut on the one side, and the co-operating pressure of New

 Jersey on the other? These are questions that temerity alone will

 answer in the affirmative.

The public debt of the Union would be a further cause of

 collision between the separate States or confederacies. The

 apportionment, in the first instance, and the progressive

 extinguishment afterward, would be alike productive of ill-humor and

 animosity. How would it be possible to agree upon a rule of

 apportionment satisfactory to all? There is scarcely any that can

 be proposed which is entirely free from real objections. These, as

 usual, would be exaggerated by the adverse interest of the parties.

 There are even dissimilar views among the States as to the general

 principle of discharging the public debt. Some of them, either less

 impressed with the importance of national credit, or because their

 citizens have little, if any, immediate interest in the question,

 feel an indifference, if not a repugnance, to the payment of the

 domestic debt at any rate. These would be inclined to magnify the

 difficulties of a distribution. Others of them, a numerous body of

 whose citizens are creditors to the public beyond proportion of the

 State in the total amount of the national debt, would be strenuous

 for some equitable and effective provision. The procrastinations of

 the former would excite the resentments of the latter. The

 settlement of a rule would, in the meantime, be postponed by real

 differences of opinion and affected delays. The citizens of the

 States interested would clamour; foreign powers would urge for the

 satisfaction of their just demands, and the peace of the States

 would be hazarded to the double contingency of external invasion and

 internal contention.

Suppose the difficulties of agreeing upon a rule surmounted, and

 the apportionment made. Still there is great room to suppose that

 the rule agreed upon would, upon experiment, be found to bear harder

 upon some States than upon others. Those which were sufferers by it

 would naturally seek for a mitigation of the burden. The others

 would as naturally be disinclined to a revision, which was likely to

 end in an increase of their own incumbrances. Their refusal would

 be too plausible a pretext to the complaining States to withhold

 their contributions, not to be embraced with avidity; and the

 non-compliance of these States with their engagements would be a

 ground of bitter discussion and altercation. If even the rule

 adopted should in practice justify the equality of its principle,

 still delinquencies in payments on the part of some of the States

 would result from a diversity of other causes--the real deficiency of

 resources; the mismanagement of their finances; accidental

 disorders in the management of the government; and, in addition to

 the rest, the reluctance with which men commonly part with money for

 purposes that have outlived the exigencies which produced them, and

 interfere with the supply of immediate wants. Delinquencies, from

 whatever causes, would be productive of complaints, recriminations,

 and quarrels. There is, perhaps, nothing more likely to disturb the

 tranquillity of nations than their being bound to mutual

 contributions for any common object that does not yield an equal and

 coincident benefit. For it is an observation, as true as it is

 trite, that there is nothing men differ so readily about as the

 payment of money.

Laws in violation of private contracts, as they amount to

 aggressions on the rights of those States whose citizens are injured

 by them, may be considered as another probable source of hostility.

 We are not authorized to expect that a more liberal or more

 equitable spirit would preside over the legislations of the

 individual States hereafter, if unrestrained by any additional

 checks, than we have heretofore seen in too many instances

 disgracing their several codes. We have observed the disposition to

 retaliation excited in Connecticut in consequence of the enormities

 perpetrated by the Legislature of Rhode Island; and we reasonably

 infer that, in similar cases, under other circumstances, a war, not

 of PARCHMENT, but of the sword, would chastise such atrocious

 breaches of moral obligation and social justice.

The probability of incompatible alliances between the different

 States or confederacies and different foreign nations, and the

 effects of this situation upon the peace of the whole, have been

 sufficiently unfolded in some preceding papers. From the view they

 have exhibited of this part of the subject, this conclusion is to be

 drawn, that America, if not connected at all, or only by the feeble

 tie of a simple league, offensive and defensive, would, by the

 operation of such jarring alliances, be gradually entangled in all

 the pernicious labyrinths of European politics and wars; and by the

 destructive contentions of the parts into which she was divided,

 would be likely to become a prey to the artifices and machinations

 of powers equally the enemies of them all. Divide et

 impera1 must be the motto of every nation that either hates or

 fears us.2 PUBLIUS.

1 Divide and command.

2 In order that the whole subject of these papers may as soon as

 possible be laid before the public, it is proposed to publish them

 four times a week--on Tuesday in the New York Packet and on

 Thursday in the Daily Advertiser.

FEDERALIST No. 8

The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States

From the New York Packet.

Tuesday, November 20, 1787.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

ASSUMING it therefore as an established truth that the several

 States, in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might

 happen to be formed out of the wreck of the general Confederacy,

 would be subject to those vicissitudes of peace and war, of

 friendship and enmity, with each other, which have fallen to the lot

 of all neighboring nations not united under one government, let us

 enter into a concise detail of some of the consequences that would

 attend such a situation.

War between the States, in the first period of their separate

 existence, would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it

 commonly is in those countries where regular military establishments

 have long obtained. The disciplined armies always kept on foot on

 the continent of Europe, though they bear a malignant aspect to

 liberty and economy, have, notwithstanding, been productive of the

 signal advantage of rendering sudden conquests impracticable, and of

 preventing that rapid desolation which used to mark the progress of

 war prior to their introduction. The art of fortification has

 contributed to the same ends. The nations of Europe are encircled

 with chains of fortified places, which mutually obstruct invasion.

 Campaigns are wasted in reducing two or three frontier garrisons,

 to gain admittance into an enemy's country. Similar impediments

 occur at every step, to exhaust the strength and delay the progress

 of an invader. Formerly, an invading army would penetrate into the

 heart of a neighboring country almost as soon as intelligence of its

 approach could be received; but now a comparatively small force of

 disciplined troops, acting on the defensive, with the aid of posts,

 is able to impede, and finally to frustrate, the enterprises of one

 much more considerable. The history of war, in that quarter of the

 globe, is no longer a history of nations subdued and empires

 overturned, but of towns taken and retaken; of battles that decide

 nothing; of retreats more beneficial than victories; of much

 effort and little acquisition.

In this country the scene would be altogether reversed. The

 jealousy of military establishments would postpone them as long as

 possible. The want of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one

 state open to another, would facilitate inroads. The populous

 States would, with little difficulty, overrun their less populous

 neighbors. Conquests would be as easy to be made as difficult to be

 retained. War, therefore, would be desultory and predatory.

 PLUNDER and devastation ever march in the train of irregulars. The

 calamities of individuals would make the principal figure in the

 events which would characterize our military exploits.

This picture is not too highly wrought; though, I confess, it

 would not long remain a just one. Safety from external danger is

 the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent

 love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. The

 violent destruction of life and property incident to war, the

 continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger,

 will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for

 repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy

 their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at length

 become willing to run the risk of being less free.

The institutions chiefly alluded to are STANDING ARMIES and the

 correspondent appendages of military establishments. Standing

 armies, it is said, are not provided against in the new

 Constitution; and it is therefore inferred that they may exist

 under it.1 Their existence, however, from the very terms of the

 proposition, is, at most, problematical and uncertain. But standing

 armies, it may be replied, must inevitably result from a dissolution

 of the Confederacy. Frequent war and constant apprehension, which

 require a state of as constant preparation, will infallibly produce

 them. The weaker States or confederacies would first have recourse

 to them, to put themselves upon an equality with their more potent

 neighbors. They would endeavor to supply the inferiority of

 population and resources by a more regular and effective system of

 defense, by disciplined troops, and by fortifications. They would,

 at the same time, be necessitated to strengthen the executive arm of

 government, in doing which their constitutions would acquire a

 progressive direction toward monarchy. It is of the nature of war

 to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative

 authority.

The expedients which have been mentioned would soon give the

 States or confederacies that made use of them a superiority over

 their neighbors. Small states, or states of less natural strength,

 under vigorous governments, and with the assistance of disciplined

 armies, have often triumphed over large states, or states of greater

 natural strength, which have been destitute of these advantages.

 Neither the pride nor the safety of the more important States or

 confederacies would permit them long to submit to this mortifying

 and adventitious superiority. They would quickly resort to means

 similar to those by which it had been effected, to reinstate

 themselves in their lost pre-eminence. Thus, we should, in a little

 time, see established in every part of this country the same engines

 of despotism which have been the scourge of the Old World. This, at

 least, would be the natural course of things; and our reasonings

 will be the more likely to be just, in proportion as they are

 accommodated to this standard.

These are not vague inferences drawn from supposed or

 speculative defects in a Constitution, the whole power of which is

 lodged in the hands of a people, or their representatives and

 delegates, but they are solid conclusions, drawn from the natural

 and necessary progress of human affairs.

It may, perhaps, be asked, by way of objection to this, why did

 not standing armies spring up out of the contentions which so often

 distracted the ancient republics of Greece? Different answers,

 equally satisfactory, may be given to this question. The

 industrious habits of the people of the present day, absorbed in the

 pursuits of gain, and devoted to the improvements of agriculture and

 commerce, are incompatible with the condition of a nation of

 soldiers, which was the true condition of the people of those

 republics. The means of revenue, which have been so greatly

 multiplied by the increase of gold and silver and of the arts of

 industry, and the science of finance, which is the offspring of

 modern times, concurring with the habits of nations, have produced

 an entire revolution in the system of war, and have rendered

 disciplined armies, distinct from the body of the citizens, the

 inseparable companions of frequent hostility.

There is a wide difference, also, between military

 establishments in a country seldom exposed by its situation to

 internal invasions, and in one which is often subject to them, and

 always apprehensive of them. The rulers of the former can have a

 good pretext, if they are even so inclined, to keep on foot armies

 so numerous as must of necessity be maintained in the latter. These

 armies being, in the first case, rarely, if at all, called into

 activity for interior defense, the people are in no danger of being

 broken to military subordination. The laws are not accustomed to

 relaxations, in favor of military exigencies; the civil state

 remains in full vigor, neither corrupted, nor confounded with the

 principles or propensities of the other state. The smallness of the

 army renders the natural strength of the community an over-match for

 it; and the citizens, not habituated to look up to the military

 power for protection, or to submit to its oppressions, neither love

 nor fear the soldiery; they view them with a spirit of jealous

 acquiescence in a necessary evil, and stand ready to resist a power

 which they suppose may be exerted to the prejudice of their rights.

 The army under such circumstances may usefully aid the magistrate

 to suppress a small faction, or an occasional mob, or insurrection;

 but it will be unable to enforce encroachments against the united

 efforts of the great body of the people.

In a country in the predicament last described, the contrary of

 all this happens. The perpetual menacings of danger oblige the

 government to be always prepared to repel it; its armies must be

 numerous enough for instant defense. The continual necessity for

 their services enhances the importance of the soldier, and

 proportionably degrades the condition of the citizen. The military

 state becomes elevated above the civil. The inhabitants of

 territories, often the theatre of war, are unavoidably subjected to

 frequent infringements on their rights, which serve to weaken their

 sense of those rights; and by degrees the people are brought to

 consider the soldiery not only as their protectors, but as their

 superiors. The transition from this disposition to that of

 considering them masters, is neither remote nor difficult; but it

 is very difficult to prevail upon a people under such impressions,

 to make a bold or effectual resistance to usurpations supported by

 the military power.

The kingdom of Great Britain falls within the first description.

 An insular situation, and a powerful marine, guarding it in a great

 measure against the possibility of foreign invasion, supersede the

 necessity of a numerous army within the kingdom. A sufficient force

 to make head against a sudden descent, till the militia could have

 time to rally and embody, is all that has been deemed requisite. No

 motive of national policy has demanded, nor would public opinion

 have tolerated, a larger number of troops upon its domestic

 establishment. There has been, for a long time past, little room

 for the operation of the other causes, which have been enumerated as

 the consequences of internal war. This peculiar felicity of

 situation has, in a great degree, contributed to preserve the

 liberty which that country to this day enjoys, in spite of the

 prevalent venality and corruption. If, on the contrary, Britain had

 been situated on the continent, and had been compelled, as she would

 have been, by that situation, to make her military establishments at

 home coextensive with those of the other great powers of Europe,

 she, like them, would in all probability be, at this day, a victim

 to the absolute power of a single man. 'T is possible, though not

 easy, that the people of that island may be enslaved from other

 causes; but it cannot be by the prowess of an army so

 inconsiderable as that which has been usually kept up within the

 kingdom.

If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages

 enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situation.

 Europe is at a great distance from us. Her colonies in our

 vicinity will be likely to continue too much disproportioned in

 strength to be able to give us any dangerous annoyance. Extensive

 military establishments cannot, in this position, be necessary to

 our security. But if we should be disunited, and the integral parts

 should either remain separated, or, which is most probable, should

 be thrown together into two or three confederacies, we should be, in

 a short course of time, in the predicament of the continental powers

 of Europe --our liberties would be a prey to the means of defending

 ourselves against the ambition and jealousy of each other.

This is an idea not superficial or futile, but solid and weighty.

 It deserves the most serious and mature consideration of every

 prudent and honest man of whatever party. If such men will make a

 firm and solemn pause, and meditate dispassionately on the

 importance of this interesting idea; if they will contemplate it in

 all its attitudes, and trace it to all its consequences, they will

 not hesitate to part with trivial objections to a Constitution, the

 rejection of which would in all probability put a final period to

 the Union. The airy phantoms that flit before the distempered

 imaginations of some of its adversaries would quickly give place to

 the more substantial forms of dangers, real, certain, and formidable.

PUBLIUS.

1 This objection will be fully examined in its proper place, and

 it will be shown that the only natural precaution which could have

 been taken on this subject has been taken; and a much better one

 than is to be found in any constitution that has been heretofore

 framed in America, most of which contain no guard at all on this

 subject.

FEDERALIST No. 9

The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection

For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

A FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and

 liberty of the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and

 insurrection. It is impossible to read the history of the petty

 republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror

 and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually

 agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they

 were kept in a state of perpetual vibration between the extremes of

 tyranny and anarchy. If they exhibit occasional calms, these only

 serve as short-lived contrast to the furious storms that are to

 succeed. If now and then intervals of felicity open to view, we

 behold them with a mixture of regret, arising from the reflection

 that the pleasing scenes before us are soon to be overwhelmed by the

 tempestuous waves of sedition and party rage. If momentary rays of

 glory break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us with a

 transient and fleeting brilliancy, they at the same time admonish us

 to lament that the vices of government should pervert the direction

 and tarnish the lustre of those bright talents and exalted

 endowments for which the favored soils that produced them have been

 so justly celebrated.

From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics

 the advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only against

 the forms of republican government, but against the very principles

 of civil liberty. They have decried all free government as

 inconsistent with the order of society, and have indulged themselves

 in malicious exultation over its friends and partisans. Happily for

 mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on the basis of liberty, which

 have flourished for ages, have, in a few glorious instances, refuted

 their gloomy sophisms. And, I trust, America will be the broad and

 solid foundation of other edifices, not less magnificent, which will

 be equally permanent monuments of their errors.

But it is not to be denied that the portraits they have sketched

 of republican government were too just copies of the originals from

 which they were taken. If it had been found impracticable to have

 devised models of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends

 to liberty would have been obliged to abandon the cause of that

 species of government as indefensible. The science of politics,

 however, like most other sciences, has received great improvement.

 The efficacy of various principles is now well understood, which

 were either not known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients.

 The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the

 introduction of legislative balances and checks; the institution of

 courts composed of judges holding their offices during good

 behavior; the representation of the people in the legislature by

 deputies of their own election: these are wholly new discoveries,

 or have made their principal progress towards perfection in modern

 times. They are means, and powerful means, by which the excellences

 of republican government may be retained and its imperfections

 lessened or avoided. To this catalogue of circumstances that tend

 to the amelioration of popular systems of civil government, I shall

 venture, however novel it may appear to some, to add one more, on a

 principle which has been made the foundation of an objection to the

 new Constitution; I mean the ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT within which

 such systems are to revolve, either in respect to the dimensions of

 a single State or to the consolidation of several smaller States

 into one great Confederacy. The latter is that which immediately

 concerns the object under consideration. It will, however, be of

 use to examine the principle in its application to a single State,

 which shall be attended to in another place.

The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress faction and to

 guard the internal tranquillity of States, as to increase their

 external force and security, is in reality not a new idea. It has

 been practiced upon in different countries and ages, and has

 received the sanction of the most approved writers on the subject of

 politics. The opponents of the plan proposed have, with great

 assiduity, cited and circulated the observations of Montesquieu on

 the necessity of a contracted territory for a republican government.

 But they seem not to have been apprised of the sentiments of that

 great man expressed in another part of his work, nor to have

 adverted to the consequences of the principle to which they

 subscribe with such ready acquiescence.

When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the

 standards he had in view were of dimensions far short of the limits

 of almost every one of these States. Neither Virginia,

 Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, nor Georgia

 can by any means be compared with the models from which he reasoned

 and to which the terms of his description apply. If we therefore

 take his ideas on this point as the criterion of truth, we shall be

 driven to the alternative either of taking refuge at once in the

 arms of monarchy, or of splitting ourselves into an infinity of

 little, jealous, clashing, tumultuous commonwealths, the wretched

 nurseries of unceasing discord, and the miserable objects of

 universal pity or contempt. Some of the writers who have come

 forward on the other side of the question seem to have been aware of

 the dilemma; and have even been bold enough to hint at the division

 of the larger States as a desirable thing. Such an infatuated

 policy, such a desperate expedient, might, by the multiplication of

 petty offices, answer the views of men who possess not

 qualifications to extend their influence beyond the narrow circles

 of personal intrigue, but it could never promote the greatness or

 happiness of the people of America.

Referring the examination of the principle itself to another

 place, as has been already mentioned, it will be sufficient to

 remark here that, in the sense of the author who has been most

 emphatically quoted upon the occasion, it would only dictate a

 reduction of the SIZE of the more considerable MEMBERS of the Union,

 but would not militate against their being all comprehended in one

 confederate government. And this is the true question, in the

 discussion of which we are at present interested.

So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in

 opposition to a general Union of the States, that he explicitly

 treats of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC as the expedient for extending the

 sphere of popular government, and reconciling the advantages of

 monarchy with those of republicanism.

``It is very probable,'' (says he1) ``that mankind would

 have been obliged at length to live constantly under the government

 of a single person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution

 that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with

 the external force of a monarchical government. I mean a

 CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC.

``This form of government is a convention by which several

 smaller STATES agree to become members of a larger ONE, which they

 intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of societies that

 constitute a new one, capable of increasing, by means of new

 associations, till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be

 able to provide for the security of the united body.

``A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force,

 may support itself without any internal corruptions. The form of

 this society prevents all manner of inconveniences.

``If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme

 authority, he could not be supposed to have an equal authority and

 credit in all the confederate states. Were he to have too great

 influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a

 part, that which would still remain free might oppose him with

 forces independent of those which he had usurped and overpower him

 before he could be settled in his usurpation.

``Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate

 states the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into

 one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The state

 may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy

 may be dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty.

``As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys

 the internal happiness of each; and with respect to its external

 situation, it is possessed, by means of the association, of all the

 advantages of large monarchies.''

I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting

 passages, because they contain a luminous abridgment of the

 principal arguments in favor of the Union, and must effectually

 remove the false impressions which a misapplication of other parts

 of the work was calculated to make. They have, at the same time, an

 intimate connection with the more immediate design of this paper;

 which is, to illustrate the tendency of the Union to repress

 domestic faction and insurrection.

A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised

 between a CONFEDERACY and a CONSOLIDATION of the States. The

 essential characteristic of the first is said to be, the restriction

 of its authority to the members in their collective capacities,

 without reaching to the individuals of whom they are composed. It

 is contended that the national council ought to have no concern with

 any object of internal administration. An exact equality of

 suffrage between the members has also been insisted upon as a

 leading feature of a confederate government. These positions are,

 in the main, arbitrary; they are supported neither by principle nor

 precedent. It has indeed happened, that governments of this kind

 have generally operated in the manner which the distinction taken

 notice of, supposes to be inherent in their nature; but there have

 been in most of them extensive exceptions to the practice, which

 serve to prove, as far as example will go, that there is no absolute

 rule on the subject. And it will be clearly shown in the course of

 this investigation that as far as the principle contended for has

 prevailed, it has been the cause of incurable disorder and

 imbecility in the government.

The definition of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC seems simply to be ``an

 assemblage of societies,'' or an association of two or more states

 into one state. The extent, modifications, and objects of the

 federal authority are mere matters of discretion. So long as the

 separate organization of the members be not abolished; so long as

 it exists, by a constitutional necessity, for local purposes;

 though it should be in perfect subordination to the general

 authority of the union, it would still be, in fact and in theory, an

 association of states, or a confederacy. The proposed Constitution,

 so far from implying an abolition of the State governments, makes

 them constituent parts of the national sovereignty, by allowing them

 a direct representation in the Senate, and leaves in their

 possession certain exclusive and very important portions of

 sovereign power. This fully corresponds, in every rational import

 of the terms, with the idea of a federal government.

In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three

 CITIES or republics, the largest were entitled to THREE votes in the

 COMMON COUNCIL, those of the middle class to TWO, and the smallest

 to ONE. The COMMON COUNCIL had the appointment of all the judges

 and magistrates of the respective CITIES. This was certainly the

 most, delicate species of interference in their internal

 administration; for if there be any thing that seems exclusively

 appropriated to the local jurisdictions, it is the appointment of

 their own officers. Yet Montesquieu, speaking of this association,

 says: ``Were I to give a model of an excellent Confederate

 Republic, it would be that of Lycia.'' Thus we perceive that the

 distinctions insisted upon were not within the contemplation of this

 enlightened civilian; and we shall be led to conclude, that they

 are the novel refinements of an erroneous theory.

PUBLIUS.

1 ``Spirit of Lawa,'' vol. i., book ix., chap. i.

FEDERALIST No. 10

The Same Subject Continued

(The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and

 Insurrection)

From the New York Packet.

Friday, November 23, 1787.

MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:

AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a wellconstructed

 Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its

 tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend

 of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their

 character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this

 dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on

 any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is

 attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability,

 injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have,

 in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments

 have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and

 fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their

 most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the

 American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and

 modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an

 unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually

 obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected.

 Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and

 virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith,

 and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too

 unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of

 rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not

 according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party,

 but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.

 However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no

 foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not permit us to deny

 that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a

 candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under

 which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our

 governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other

 causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes;

 and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of

 public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed

 from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly,

 if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which

 a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.

By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether

 amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united

 and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest,

 adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and

 aggregate interests of the community.

There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the

 one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.

There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction:

 the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its

 existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions,

 the same passions, and the same interests.

It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that

 it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to

 fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could

 not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to

 political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to

 wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life,

 because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be

 unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is

 at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As

 long as the connection subsists between his reason and his

 self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal

 influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which

 the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties

 of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an

 insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection

 of these faculties is the first object of government. From the

 protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property,

 the possession of different degrees and kinds of property

 immediately results; and from the influence of these on the

 sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a

 division of the society into different interests and parties.

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man;

 and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of

 activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society.

 A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning

 government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of

 practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending

 for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions

 whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in

 turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual

 animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress

 each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is

 this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that

 where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous

 and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their

 unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But

 the most common and durable source of factions has been the various

 and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who

 are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society.

 Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a

 like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a

 mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests,

 grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into

 different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The

 regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the

 principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of

 party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the

 government.

No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his

 interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably,

 corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body

 of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time;

 yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so

 many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of

 single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of

 citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators but

 advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law

 proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the

 creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other.

 Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties

 are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous

 party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be

 expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and

 in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are

 questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the

 manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to

 justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the

 various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require

 the most exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative

 act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a

 predominant party to trample on the rules of justice. Every

 shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a

 shilling saved to their own pockets.

It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to

 adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to

 the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the

 helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all

 without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which

 will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may

 find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.

The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of

 faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in

 the means of controlling its EFFECTS.

If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is

 supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to

 defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the

 administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable

 to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution.

 When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular

 government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling

 passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other

 citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the

 danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the

 spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object

 to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the

 great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued

 from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be

 recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.

By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of

 two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a

 majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having

 such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their

 number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect

 schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be

 suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious

 motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found

 to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose

 their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together, that

 is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.

From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure

 democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of

 citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can

 admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or

 interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the

 whole; a communication and concert result from the form of

 government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to

 sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is

 that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and

 contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal

 security or the rights of property; and have in general been as

 short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.

 Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of

 government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a

 perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same

 time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions,

 their opinions, and their passions.

A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of

 representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises

 the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in

 which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both

 the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from

 the Union.

The two great points of difference between a democracy and a

 republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the

 latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest;

 secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of

 country, over which the latter may be extended.

The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to

 refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the

 medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern

 the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of

 justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial

 considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that

 the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people,

 will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the

 people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the

 effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local

 prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption,

 or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the

 interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether small

 or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper

 guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of

 the latter by two obvious considerations:

In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the

 republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain

 number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that,

 however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number,

 in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the

 number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion

 to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in

 the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit

 characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the

 former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater

 probability of a fit choice.

In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a

 greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic,

 it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with

 success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried;

 and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more

 likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and

 the most diffusive and established characters.

It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there

 is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to

 lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the

 representatives too little acquainted with all their local

 circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you

 render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to

 comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal

 Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great

 and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local

 and particular to the State legislatures.

The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens

 and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of

 republican than of democratic government; and it is this

 circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to

 be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the

 society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and

 interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and

 interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same

 party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a

 majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed,

 the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of

 oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of

 parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of

 the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other

 citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more

 difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to

 act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be

 remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or

 dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust

 in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.

Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a

 republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of

 faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic,--is enjoyed by

 the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist

 in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and

 virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and

 schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation

 of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite

 endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a

 greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being

 able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the

 increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase

 this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles

 opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an

 unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the

 Union gives it the most palpable advantage.

The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within

 their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general

 conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may

 degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy;

 but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must

 secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A

 rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal

 division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project,

 will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a

 particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is

 more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire

 State.

In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we

 behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to

 republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and

 pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in

 cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists.

PUBLIUS.

FEDERALIST No. 11

The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a

 Navy

For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE importance of the Union, in a commercial light, is one of

 those points about which there is least room to entertain a

 difference of opinion, and which has, in fact, commanded the most

 general assent of men who have any acquaintance with the subject.

 This applies as well to our intercourse with foreign countries as

 with each other.

There are appearances to authorize a supposition that the

 adventurous spirit, which distinguishes the commercial character of

 America, has already excited uneasy sensations in several of the

 maritime powers of Europe. They seem to be apprehensive of our too

 great interference in that carrying trade, which is the support of

 their navigation and the foundation of their naval strength. Those

 of them which have colonies in America look forward to what this

 country is capable of becoming, with painful solicitude. They

 foresee the dangers that may threaten their American dominions from

 the neighborhood of States, which have all the dispositions, and

 would possess all the means, requisite to the creation of a powerful

 marine. Impressions of this kind will naturally indicate the policy

 of fostering divisions among us, and of depriving us, as far as

 possible, of an ACTIVE COMMERCE in our own bottoms. This would

 answer the threefold purpose of preventing our interference in their

 navigation, of monopolizing the profits of our trade, and of

 clipping the wings by which we might soar to a dangerous greatness.

 Did not prudence forbid the detail, it would not be difficult to

 trace, by facts, the workings of this policy to the cabinets of

 ministers.

If we continue united, we may counteract a policy so unfriendly

 to our prosperity in a variety of ways. By prohibitory regulations,

 extending, at the same time, throughout the States, we may oblige

 foreign countries to bid against each other, for the privileges of

 our markets. This assertion will not appear chimerical to those who

 are able to appreciate the importance of the markets of three

 millions of people--increasing in rapid progression, for the most

 part exclusively addicted to agriculture, and likely from local

 circumstances to remain so--to any manufacturing nation; and the

 immense difference there would be to the trade and navigation of

 such a nation, between a direct communication in its own ships, and

 an indirect conveyance of its products and returns, to and from

 America, in the ships of another country. Suppose, for instance, we

 had a government in America, capable of excluding Great Britain

 (with whom we have at present no treaty of commerce) from all our

 ports; what would be the probable operation of this step upon her

 politics? Would it not enable us to negotiate, with the fairest

 prospect of success, for commercial privileges of the most valuable

 and extensive kind, in the dominions of that kingdom? When these

 questions have been asked, upon other occasions, they have received

 a plausible, but not a solid or satisfactory answer. It has been

 said that prohibitions on our part would produce no change in the

 system of Britain, because she could prosecute her trade with us

 through the medium of the Dutch, who would be her immediate

 customers and paymasters for those articles which were wanted for

 the supply of our markets. But would not her navigation be

 materially injured by the loss of the important advantage of being

 her own carrier in that trade? Would not the principal part of its

 profits be intercepted by the Dutch, as a compensation for their

 agency and risk? Would not the mere circumstance of freight

 occasion a considerable deduction? Would not so circuitous an

 intercourse facilitate the competitions of other nations, by

 enhancing the price of British commodities in our markets, and by

 transferring to other hands the management of this interesting

 branch of the British commerce?

A mature consideration of the objects suggested by these

 questions will justify a belief that the real disadvantages to

 Britain from such a state of things, conspiring with the

 pre-possessions of a great part of the nation in favor of the

 American trade, and with the importunities of the West India

 islands, would produce a relaxation in her present system, and would

 let us into the enjoyment of privileges in the markets of those

 islands elsewhere, from which our trade would derive the most

 substantial benefits. Such a point gained from the British

 government, and which could not be expected without an equivalent in

 exemptions and immunities in our markets, would be likely to have a

 correspondent effect on the conduct of other nations, who would not

 be inclined to see themselves altogether supplanted in our trade.

A further resource for influencing the conduct of European

 nations toward us, in this respect, would arise from the

 establishment of a federal navy. There can be no doubt that the

 continuance of the Union under an efficient government would put it

 in our power, at a period not very distant, to create a navy which,

 if it could not vie with those of the great maritime powers, would

 at least be of respectable weight if thrown into the scale of either

 of two contending parties. This would be more peculiarly the case

 in relation to operations in the West Indies. A few ships of the

 line, sent opportunely to the reinforcement of either side, would

 often be sufficient to decide the fate of a campaign, on the event

 of which interests of the greatest magnitude were suspended. Our

 position is, in this respect, a most commanding one. And if to this

 consideration we add that of the usefulness of supplies from this

 country, in the prosecution of military operations in the West

 Indies, it will readily be perceived that a situation so favorable

 would enable us to bargain with great advantage for commercial

 privileges. A price would be set not only upon our friendship, but

 upon our neutrality. By a steady adherence to the Union we may

 hope, erelong, to become the arbiter of Europe in America, and to be

 able to incline the balance of European competitions in this part of

 the world as our interest may dictate.

But in the reverse of this eligible situation, we shall discover

 that the rivalships of the parts would make them checks upon each

 other, and would frustrate all the tempting advantages which nature

 has kindly placed within our reach. In a state so insignificant our

 commerce would be a prey to the wanton intermeddlings of all nations

 at war with each other; who, having nothing to fear from us, would

 with little scruple or remorse, supply their wants by depredations

 on our property as often as it fell in their way. The rights of

 neutrality will only be respected when they are defended by an

 adequate power. A nation, despicable by its weakness, forfeits even

 the privilege of being neutral.

Under a vigorous national government, the natural strength and

 resources of the country, directed to a common interest, would

 baffle all the combinations of European jealousy to restrain our

 growth. This situation would even take away the motive to such

 combinations, by inducing an impracticability of success. An active

 commerce, an extensive navigation, and a flourishing marine would

 then be the offspring of moral and physical necessity. We might

 defy the little arts of the little politicians to control or vary

 the irresistible and unchangeable course of nature.

But in a state of disunion, these combinations might exist and

 might operate with success. It would be in the power of the

 maritime nations, availing themselves of our universal impotence, to

 prescribe the conditions of our political existence; and as they

 have a common interest in being our carriers, and still more in

 preventing our becoming theirs, they would in all probability

 combine to embarrass our navigation in such a manner as would in

 effect destroy it, and confine us to a PASSIVE COMMERCE. We should

 then be compelled to content ourselves with the first price of our

 commodities, and to see the profits of our trade snatched from us to

 enrich our enemies and p rsecutors. That unequaled spirit of

 enterprise, which signalizes the genius of the American merchants

 and navigators, and which is in itself an inexhaustible mine of

 national wealth, would be stifled and lost, and poverty and disgrace

 would overspread a country which, with wisdom, might make herself

 the admiration and envy of the world.

There are rights of great moment to the trade of America which

 are rights of the Union--I allude to the fisheries, to the navigation

 of the Western lakes, and to that of the Mississippi. The

 dissolution of the Confederacy would give room for delicate

 questions concerning the future existence of these rights; which

 the interest of more powerful partners would hardly fail to solve to

 our disadvantage. The disposition of Spain with regard to the

 Mississippi needs no comment. France and Britain are concerned with

 us in the fisheries, and view them as of the utmost moment to their

 navigation. They, of course, would hardly remain long indifferent

 to that decided mastery, of which experience has shown us to be

 possessed in this valuable branch of traffic, and by which we are

 able to undersell those nations in their own markets. What more

 natural than that they should be disposed to exclude from the lists

 such dangerous competitors?

This branch of trade ought not to be considered as a partial

 benefit. All the navigating States may, in different degrees,

 advantageously participate in it, and under circumstances of a

 greater extension of mercantile capital, would not be unlikely to do

 it. As a nursery of seamen, it now is, or when time shall have more

 nearly assimilated the principles of navigation in the several

 States, will become, a universal resource. To the establishment of

 a navy, it must be indispensable.

To this great national object, a NAVY, union will contribute in

 various ways. Every institution will grow and flourish in

 proportion to the quantity and extent of the means concentred

 towards its formation and support. A navy of the United States, as

 it would embrace the resources of all, is an object far less remote

 than a navy of any single State or partial confederacy, which would

 only embrace the resources of a single part. It happens, indeed,

 that different portions of confederated America possess each some

 peculiar advantage for this essential establishment. The more

 southern States furnish in greater abundance certain kinds of naval

 stores--tar, pitch, and turpentine. Their wood for the construction

 of ships is also of a more solid and lasting texture. The

 difference in the duration of the ships of which the navy might be

 composed, if chiefly constructed of Southern wood, would be of

 signal importance, either in the view of naval strength or of

 national economy. Some of the Southern and of the Middle States

 yield a greater plenty of iron, and of better quality. Seamen must

 chiefly be drawn from the Northern hive. The necessity of naval

 protection to external or maritime commerce does not require a

 particular elucidation, no more than the conduciveness of that

 species of commerce to the prosperity of a navy.

An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will

 advance the trade of each by an interchange of their respective

 productions, not only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home,

 but for exportation to foreign markets. The veins of commerce in

 every part will be replenished, and will acquire additional motion

 and vigor from a free circulation of the commodities of every part.

 Commercial enterprise will have much greater scope, from the

 diversity in the productions of different States. When the staple

 of one fails from a bad harvest or unproductive crop, it can call to

 its aid the staple of another. The variety, not less than the

 value, of products for exportation contributes to the activity of

 foreign commerce. It can be conducted upon much better terms with a

 large number of materials of a given value than with a small number

 of materials of the same value; arising from the competitions of

 trade and from the fluctations of markets. Particular articles may

 be in great demand at certain periods, and unsalable at others; but

 if there be a variety of articles, it can scarcely happen that they

 should all be at one time in the latter predicament, and on this

 account the operations of the merchant would be less liable to any

 considerable obstruction or stagnation. The speculative trader will

 at once perceive the force of these observations, and will

 acknowledge that the aggregate balance of the commerce of the United

 States would bid fair to be much more favorable than that of the

 thirteen States without union or with partial unions.

It may perhaps be replied to this, that whether the States are

 united or disunited, there would still be an intimate intercourse

 between them which would answer the same ends; this intercourse

 would be fettered, interrupted, and narrowed by a multiplicity of

 causes, which in the course of these papers have been amply detailed.

 A unity of commercial, as well as political, interests, can only

 result from a unity of government.

There are other points of view in which this subject might be

 placed, of a striking and animating kind. But they would lead us

 too far into the regions of futurity, and would involve topics not

 proper for a newspaper discussion. I shall briefly observe, that

 our situation invites and our interests prompt us to aim at an

 ascendant in the system of American affairs. The world may

 politically, as well as geographically, be divided into four parts,

 each having a distinct set of interests. Unhappily for the other

 three, Europe, by her arms and by her negotiations, by force and by

 fraud, has, in different degrees, extended her dominion over them

 all. Africa, Asia, and America, have successively felt her

 domination. The superiority she has long maintained has tempted her

 to plume herself as the Mistress of the World, and to consider the

 rest of mankind as created for her benefit. Men admired as profound

 philosophers have, in direct terms, attributed to her inhabitants a

 physical superiority, and have gravely asserted that all animals,

 and with them the human species, degenerate in America--that even

 dogs cease to bark after having breathed awhile in our

 atmosphere.1 Facts have too long supported these arrogant

 pretensions of the Europeans. It belongs to us to vindicate the

 honor of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother,

 moderation. Union will enable us to do it. Disunion will will add

 another victim to his triumphs. Let Americans disdain to be the

 instruments of European greatness! Let the thirteen States, bound

 together in a strict and indissoluble Union, concur in erecting one

 great American system, superior to the control of all transatlantic

 force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connection

 between the old and the new world!

PUBLIUS.

``Recherches philosophiques sur les Americains.''

FEDERALIST No. 12

The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue

From the New York Packet.

Tuesday, November 27, 1787.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE effects of Union upon the commercial prosperity of the

 States have been sufficiently delineated. Its tendency to promote

 the interests of revenue will be the subject of our present inquiry.

The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged by

 all enlightened statesmen to be the most useful as well as the most

 productive source of national wealth, and has accordingly become a

 primary object of their political cares. By multipying the means of

 gratification, by promoting the introduction and circulation of the

 precious metals, those darling objects of human avarice and

 enterprise, it serves to vivify and invigorate the channels of

 industry, and to make them flow with greater activity and

 copiousness. The assiduous merchant, the laborious husbandman, the

 active mechanic, and the industrious manufacturer,--all orders of

 men, look forward with eager expectation and growing alacrity to

 this pleasing reward of their toils. The often-agitated question

 between agriculture and commerce has, from indubitable experience,

 received a decision which has silenced the rivalship that once

 subsisted between them, and has proved, to the satisfaction of their

 friends, that their interests are intimately blended and interwoven.

 It has been found in various countries that, in proportion as

 commerce has flourished, land has risen in value. And how could it

 have happened otherwise? Could that which procures a freer vent for

 the products of the earth, which furnishes new incitements to the

 cultivation of land, which is the most powerful instrument in

 increasing the quantity of money in a state--could that, in fine,

 which is the faithful handmaid of labor and industry, in every

 shape, fail to augment that article, which is the prolific parent of

 far the greatest part of the objects upon which they are exerted?

 It is astonishing that so simple a truth should ever have had an

 adversary; and it is one, among a multitude of proofs, how apt a

 spirit of ill-informed jealousy, or of too great abstraction and

 refinement, is to lead men astray from the plainest truths of reason

 and conviction.

The ability of a country to pay taxes must always be

 proportioned, in a great degree, to the quantity of money in

 circulation, and to the celerity with which it circulates.

 Commerce, contributing to both these objects, must of necessity

 render the payment of taxes easier, and facilitate the requisite

 supplies to the treasury. The hereditary dominions of the Emperor

 of Germany contain a great extent of fertile, cultivated, and

 populous territory, a large proportion of which is situated in mild

 and luxuriant climates. In some parts of this territory are to be

 found the best gold and silver mines in Europe. And yet, from the

 want of the fostering influence of commerce, that monarch can boast

 but slender revenues. He has several times been compelled to owe

 obligations to the pecuniary succors of other nations for the

 preservation of his essential interests, and is unable, upon the

 strength of his own resources, to sustain a long or continued war.

But it is not in this aspect of the subject alone that Union

 will be seen to conduce to the purpose of revenue. There are other

 points of view, in which its influence will appear more immediate

 and decisive. It is evident from the state of the country, from the

 habits of the people, from the experience we have had on the point

 itself, that it is impracticable to raise any very considerable sums

 by direct taxation. Tax laws have in vain been multiplied; new

 methods to enforce the collection have in vain been tried; the

 public expectation has been uniformly disappointed, and the

 treasuries of the States have remained empty. The popular system of

 administration inherent in the nature of popular government,

 coinciding with the real scarcity of money incident to a languid and

 mutilated state of trade, has hitherto defeated every experiment for

 extensive collections, and has at length taught the different

 legislatures the folly of attempting them.

No person acquainted with what happens in other countries will

 be surprised at this circumstance. In so opulent a nation as that

 of Britain, where direct taxes from superior wealth must be much

 more tolerable, and, from the vigor of the government, much more

 practicable, than in America, far the greatest part of the national

 revenue is derived from taxes of the indirect kind, from imposts,

 and from excises. Duties on imported articles form a large branch

 of this latter description.

In America, it is evident that we must a long time depend for

 the means of revenue chiefly on such duties. In most parts of it,

 excises must be confined within a narrow compass. The genius of the

 people will ill brook the inquisitive and peremptory spirit of

 excise laws. The pockets of the farmers, on the other hand, will

 reluctantly yield but scanty supplies, in the unwelcome shape of

 impositions on their houses and lands; and personal property is too

 precarious and invisible a fund to be laid hold of in any other way

 than by the inperceptible agency of taxes on consumption.

If these remarks have any foundation, that state of things which

 will best enable us to improve and extend so valuable a resource

 must be best adapted to our political welfare. And it cannot admit

 of a serious doubt, that this state of things must rest on the basis

 of a general Union. As far as this would be conducive to the

 interests of commerce, so far it must tend to the extension of the

 revenue to be drawn from that source. As far as it would contribute

 to rendering regulations for the collection of the duties more

 simple and efficacious, so far it must serve to answer the purposes

 of making the same rate of duties more productive, and of putting it

 into the power of the government to increase the rate without

 prejudice to trade.

The relative situation of these States; the number of rivers

 with which they are intersected, and of bays that wash there shores;

 the facility of communication in every direction; the affinity of

 language and manners; the familiar habits of intercourse; --all

 these are circumstances that would conspire to render an illicit

 trade between them a matter of little difficulty, and would insure

 frequent evasions of the commercial regulations of each other. The

 separate States or confederacies would be necessitated by mutual

 jealousy to avoid the temptations to that kind of trade by the

 lowness of their duties. The temper of our governments, for a long

 time to come, would not permit those rigorous precautions by which

 the European nations guard the avenues into their respective

 countries, as well by land as by water; and which, even there, are

 found insufficient obstacles to the adventurous stratagems of

 avarice.

In France, there is an army of patrols (as they are called)

 constantly employed to secure their fiscal regulations against the

 inroads of the dealers in contraband trade. Mr. Neckar computes the

 number of these patrols at upwards of twenty thousand. This shows

 the immense difficulty in preventing that species of traffic, where

 there is an inland communication, and places in a strong light the

 disadvantages with which the collection of duties in this country

 would be encumbered, if by disunion the States should be placed in a

 situation, with respect to each other, resembling that of France

 with respect to her neighbors. The arbitrary and vexatious powers

 with which the patrols are necessarily armed, would be intolerable

 in a free country.

If, on the contrary, there be but one government pervading all

 the States, there will be, as to the principal part of our commerce,

 but ONE SIDE to guard--the ATLANTIC COAST. Vessels arriving directly

 from foreign countries, laden with valuable cargoes, would rarely

 choose to hazard themselves to the complicated and critical perils

 which would attend attempts to unlade prior to their coming into

 port. They would have to dread both the dangers of the coast, and

 of detection, as well after as before their arrival at the places of

 their final destination. An ordinary degree of vigilance would be

 competent to the prevention of any material infractions upon the

 rights of the revenue. A few armed vessels, judiciously stationed

 at the entrances of our ports, might at a small expense be made

 useful sentinels of the laws. And the government having the same

 interest to provide against violations everywhere, the co-operation

 of its measures in each State would have a powerful tendency to

 render them effectual. Here also we should preserve by Union, an

 advantage which nature holds out to us, and which would be

 relinquished by separation. The United States lie at a great

 distance from Europe, and at a considerable distance from all other

 places with which they would have extensive connections of foreign

 trade. The passage from them to us, in a few hours, or in a single

 night, as between the coasts of France and Britain, and of other

 neighboring nations, would be impracticable. This is a prodigious

 security against a direct contraband with foreign countries; but a

 circuitous contraband to one State, through the medium of another,

 would be both easy and safe. The difference between a direct

 importation from abroad, and an indirect importation through the

 channel of a neighboring State, in small parcels, according to time

 and opportunity, with the additional facilities of inland

 communication, must be palpable to every man of discernment.

It is therefore evident, that one national government would be

 able, at much less expense, to extend the duties on imports, beyond

 comparison, further than would be practicable to the States

 separately, or to any partial confederacies. Hitherto, I believe,

 it may safely be asserted, that these duties have not upon an

 average exceeded in any State three per cent. In France they are

 estimated to be about fifteen per cent., and in Britain they exceed

 this proportion.1 There seems to be nothing to hinder their

 being increased in this country to at least treble their present

 amount. The single article of ardent spirits, under federal

 regulation, might be made to furnish a considerable revenue. Upon a

 ratio to the importation into this State, the whole quantity

 imported into the United States may be estimated at four millions of

 gallons; which, at a shilling per gallon, would produce two hundred

 thousand pounds. That article would well bear this rate of duty;

 and if it should tend to diminish the consumption of it, such an

 effect would be equally favorable to the agriculture, to the

 economy, to the morals, and to the health of the society. There is,

 perhaps, nothing so much a subject of national extravagance as these

 spirits.

What will be the consequence, if we are not able to avail

 ourselves of the resource in question in its full extent? A nation

 cannot long exist without revenues. Destitute of this essential

 support, it must resign its independence, and sink into the degraded

 condition of a province. This is an extremity to which no

 government will of choice accede. Revenue, therefore, must be had

 at all events. In this country, if the principal part be not drawn

 from commerce, it must fall with oppressive weight upon land. It

 has been already intimated that excises, in their true

 signification, are too little in unison with the feelings of the

 people, to admit of great use being made of that mode of taxation;

 nor, indeed, in the States where almost the sole employment is

 agriculture, are the objects proper for excise sufficiently numerous

 to permit very ample collections in that way. Personal estate (as

 has been before remarked), from the difficulty in tracing it, cannot

 be subjected to large contributions, by any other means than by

 taxes on consumption. In populous cities, it may be enough the

 subject of conjecture, to occasion the oppression of individuals,

 without much aggregate benefit to the State; but beyond these

 circles, it must, in a great measure, escape the eye and the hand of

 the tax-gatherer. As the necessities of the State, nevertheless,

 must be satisfied in some mode or other, the defect of other

 resources must throw the principal weight of public burdens on the

 possessors of land. And as, on the other hand, the wants of the

 government can never obtain an adequate supply, unless all the

 sources of revenue are open to its demands, the finances of the

 community, under such embarrassments, cannot be put into a situation

 consistent with its respectability or its security. Thus we shall

 not even have the consolations of a full treasury, to atone for the

 oppression of that valuable class of the citizens who are employed

 in the cultivation of the soil. But public and private distress

 will keep pace with each other in gloomy concert; and unite in

 deploring the infatuation of those counsels which led to disunion.

PUBLIUS.

1 If my memory be right they amount to twenty per cent.

FEDERALIST No. 13

Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government

For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

As CONNECTED with the subject of revenue, we may with propriety

 consider that of economy. The money saved from one object may be

 usefully applied to another, and there will be so much the less to

 be drawn from the pockets of the people. If the States are united

 under one government, there will be but one national civil list to

 support; if they are divided into several confederacies, there will

 be as many different national civil lists to be provided for--and

 each of them, as to the principal departments, coextensive with that

 which would be necessary for a government of the whole. The entire

 separation of the States into thirteen unconnected sovereignties is

 a project too extravagant and too replete with danger to have many

 advocates. The ideas of men who speculate upon the dismemberment of

 the empire seem generally turned toward three confederacies--one

 consisting of the four Northern, another of the four Middle, and a

 third of the five Southern States. There is little probability that

 there would be a greater number. According to this distribution,

 each confederacy would comprise an extent of territory larger than

 that of the kingdom of Great Britain. No well-informed man will

 suppose that the affairs of such a confederacy can be properly

 regulated by a government less comprehensive in its organs or

 institutions than that which has been proposed by the convention.

 When the dimensions of a State attain to a certain magnitude, it

 requires the same energy of government and the same forms of

 administration which are requisite in one of much greater extent.

 This idea admits not of precise demonstration, because there is no

 rule by which we can measure the momentum of civil power necessary

 to the government of any given number of individuals; but when we

 consider that the island of Britain, nearly commensurate with each

 of the supposed confederacies, contains about eight millions of

 people, and when we reflect upon the degree of authority required to

 direct the passions of so large a society to the public good, we

 shall see no reason to doubt that the like portion of power would be

 sufficient to perform the same task in a society far more numerous.

 Civil power, properly organized and exerted, is capable of

 diffusing its force to a very great extent; and can, in a manner,

 reproduce itself in every part of a great empire by a judicious

 arrangement of subordinate institutions.

The supposition that each confederacy into which the States

 would be likely to be divided would require a government not less

 comprehensive than the one proposed, will be strengthened by another

 supposition, more probable than that which presents us with three

 confederacies as the alternative to a general Union. If we attend

 carefully to geographical and commercial considerations, in

 conjunction with the habits and prejudices of the different States,

 we shall be led to conclude that in case of disunion they will most

 naturally league themselves under two governments. The four Eastern

 States, from all the causes that form the links of national sympathy

 and connection, may with certainty be expected to unite. New York,

 situated as she is, would never be unwise enough to oppose a feeble

 and unsupported flank to the weight of that confederacy. There are

 other obvious reasons that would facilitate her accession to it.

 New Jersey is too small a State to think of being a frontier, in

 opposition to this still more powerful combination; nor do there

 appear to be any obstacles to her admission into it. Even

 Pennsylvania would have strong inducements to join the Northern

 league. An active foreign commerce, on the basis of her own

 navigation, is her true policy, and coincides with the opinions and

 dispositions of her citizens. The more Southern States, from

 various circumstances, may not think themselves much interested in

 the encouragement of navigation. They may prefer a system which

 would give unlimited scope to all nations to be the carriers as well

 as the purchasers of their commodities. Pennsylvania may not choose

 to confound her interests in a connection so adverse to her policy.

 As she must at all events be a frontier, she may deem it most

 consistent with her safety to have her exposed side turned towards

 the weaker power of the Southern, rather than towards the stronger

 power of the Northern, Confederacy. This would give her the fairest

 chance to avoid being the Flanders of America. Whatever may be the

 determination of Pennsylvania, if the Northern Confederacy includes

 New Jersey, there is no likelihood of more than one confederacy to

 the south of that State.

Nothing can be more evident than that the thirteen States will

 be able to support a national government better than one half, or

 one third, or any number less than the whole. This reflection must

 have great weight in obviating that objection to the proposed plan,

 which is founded on the principle of expense; an objection,

 however, which, when we come to take a nearer view of it, will

 appear in every light to stand on mistaken ground.

If, in addition to the consideration of a plurality of civil

 lists, we take into view the number of persons who must necessarily

 be employed to guard the inland communication between the different

 confederacies against illicit trade, and who in time will infallibly

 spring up out of the necessities of revenue; and if we also take

 into view the military establishments which it has been shown would

 unavoidably result from the jealousies and conflicts of the several

 nations into which the States would be divided, we shall clearly

 discover that a separation would be not less injurious to the

 economy, than to the tranquillity, commerce, revenue, and liberty of

 every part.

PUBLIUS.

FEDERALIST No. 14

Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory

 Answered

From the New York Packet.

Friday, November 30, 1787.

MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:

WE HAVE seen the necessity of the Union, as our bulwark against

 foreign danger, as the conservator of peace among ourselves, as the

 guardian of our commerce and other common interests, as the only

 substitute for those military establishments which have subverted

 the liberties of the Old World, and as the proper antidote for the

 diseases of faction, which have proved fatal to other popular

 governments, and of which alarming symptoms have been betrayed by

 our own. All that remains, within this branch of our inquiries, is

 to take notice of an objection that may be drawn from the great

 extent of country which the Union embraces. A few observations on

 this subject will be the more proper, as it is perceived that the

 adversaries of the new Constitution are availing themselves of the

 prevailing prejudice with regard to the practicable sphere of

 republican administration, in order to supply, by imaginary

 difficulties, the want of those solid objections which they endeavor

 in vain to find.

The error which limits republican government to a narrow

 district has been unfolded and refuted in preceding papers. I

 remark here only that it seems to owe its rise and prevalence

 chiefly to the confounding of a republic with a democracy, applying

 to the former reasonings drawn from the nature of the latter. The

 true distinction between these forms was also adverted to on a

 former occasion. It is, that in a democracy, the people meet and

 exercise the government in person; in a republic, they assemble and

 administer it by their representatives and agents. A democracy,

 consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be

 extended over a large region.

To this accidental source of the error may be added the artifice

 of some celebrated authors, whose writings have had a great share in

 forming the modern standard of political opinions. Being subjects

 either of an absolute or limited monarchy, they have endeavored to

 heighten the advantages, or palliate the evils of those forms, by

 placing in comparison the vices and defects of the republican, and

 by citing as specimens of the latter the turbulent democracies of

 ancient Greece and modern Italy. Under the confusion of names, it

 has been an easy task to transfer to a republic observations

 applicable to a democracy only; and among others, the observation

 that it can never be established but among a small number of people,

 living within a small compass of territory.

Such a fallacy may have been the less perceived, as most of the

 popular governments of antiquity were of the democratic species;

 and even in modern Europe, to which we owe the great principle of

 representation, no example is seen of a government wholly popular,

 and founded, at the same time, wholly on that principle. If Europe

 has the merit of discovering this great mechanical power in

 government, by the simple agency of which the will of the largest

 political body may be concentred, and its force directed to any

 object which the public good requires, America can claim the merit

 of making the discovery the basis of unmixed and extensive republics.

 It is only to be lamented that any of her citizens should wish to

 deprive her of the additional merit of displaying its full efficacy

 in the establishment of the comprehensive system now under her

 consideration.

As the natural limit of a democracy is that distance from the

 central point which will just permit the most remote citizens to

 assemble as often as their public functions demand, and will include

 no greater number than can join in those functions; so the natural

 limit of a republic is that distance from the centre which will

 barely allow the representatives to meet as often as may be

 necessary for the administration of public affairs. Can it be said

 that the limits of the United States exceed this distance? It will

 not be said by those who recollect that the Atlantic coast is the

 longest side of the Union, that during the term of thirteen years,

 the representatives of the States have been almost continually

 assembled, and that the members from the most distant States are not

 chargeable with greater intermissions of attendance than those from

 the States in the neighborhood of Congress.

That we may form a juster estimate with regard to this

 interesting subject, let us resort to the actual dimensions of the

 Union. The limits, as fixed by the treaty of peace, are: on the

 east the Atlantic, on the south the latitude of thirty-one degrees,

 on the west the Mississippi, and on the north an irregular line

 running in some instances beyond the forty-fifth degree, in others

 falling as low as the forty-second. The southern shore of Lake Erie

 lies below that latitude. Computing the distance between the

 thirty-first and forty-fifth degrees, it amounts to nine hundred and

 seventy-three common miles; computing it from thirty-one to

 forty-two degrees, to seven hundred and sixty-four miles and a half.

 Taking the mean for the distance, the amount will be eight hundred

 and sixty-eight miles and three-fourths. The mean distance from the

 Atlantic to the Mississippi does not probably exceed seven hundred

 and fifty miles. On a comparison of this extent with that of

 several countries in Europe, the practicability of rendering our

 system commensurate to it appears to be demonstrable. It is not a

 great deal larger than Germany, where a diet representing the whole

 empire is continually assembled; or than Poland before the late

 dismemberment, where another national diet was the depositary of the

 supreme power. Passing by France and Spain, we find that in Great

 Britain, inferior as it may be in size, the representatives of the

 northern extremity of the island have as far to travel to the

 national council as will be required of those of the most remote

 parts of the Union.

Favorable as this view of the subject may be, some observations

 remain which will place it in a light still more satisfactory.

In the first place it is to be remembered that the general

 government is not to be charged with the whole power of making and

 administering laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain

 enumerated objects, which concern all the members of the republic,

 but which are not to be attained by the separate provisions of any.

 The subordinate governments, which can extend their care to all

 those other subjects which can be separately provided for, will

 retain their due authority and activity. Were it proposed by the

 plan of the convention to abolish the governments of the particular

 States, its adversaries would have some ground for their objection;

 though it would not be difficult to show that if they were

 abolished the general government would be compelled, by the

 principle of self-preservation, to reinstate them in their proper

 jurisdiction.

A second observation to be made is that the immediate object of

 the federal Constitution is to secure the union of the thirteen

 primitive States, which we know to be practicable; and to add to

 them such other States as may arise in their own bosoms, or in their

 neighborhoods, which we cannot doubt to be equally practicable. The

 arrangements that may be necessary for those angles and fractions of

 our territory which lie on our northwestern frontier, must be left

 to those whom further discoveries and experience will render more

 equal to the task.

Let it be remarked, in the third place, that the intercourse

 throughout the Union will be facilitated by new improvements. Roads

 will everywhere be shortened, and kept in better order;

 accommodations for travelers will be multiplied and meliorated; an

 interior navigation on our eastern side will be opened throughout,

 or nearly throughout, the whole extent of the thirteen States. The

 communication between the Western and Atlantic districts, and

 between different parts of each, will be rendered more and more easy

 by those numerous canals with which the beneficence of nature has

 intersected our country, and which art finds it so little difficult

 to connect and complete.

A fourth and still more important consideration is, that as

 almost every State will, on one side or other, be a frontier, and

 will thus find, in regard to its safety, an inducement to make some

 sacrifices for the sake of the general protection; so the States

 which lie at the greatest distance from the heart of the Union, and

 which, of course, may partake least of the ordinary circulation of

 its benefits, will be at the same time immediately contiguous to

 foreign nations, and will consequently stand, on particular

 occasions, in greatest need of its strength and resources. It may

 be inconvenient for Georgia, or the States forming our western or

 northeastern borders, to send their representatives to the seat of

 government; but they would find it more so to struggle alone

 against an invading enemy, or even to support alone the whole

 expense of those precautions which may be dictated by the

 neighborhood of continual danger. If they should derive less

 benefit, therefore, from the Union in some respects than the less

 distant States, they will derive greater benefit from it in other

 respects, and thus the proper equilibrium will be maintained

 throughout.

I submit to you, my fellow-citizens, these considerations, in

 full confidence that the good sense which has so often marked your

 decisions will allow them their due weight and effect; and that you

 will never suffer difficulties, however formidable in appearance, or

 however fashionable the error on which they may be founded, to drive

 you into the gloomy and perilous scene into which the advocates for

 disunion would conduct you. Hearken not to the unnatural voice

 which tells you that the people of America, knit together as they

 are by so many cords of affection, can no longer live together as

 members of the same family; can no longer continue the mutual

 guardians of their mutual happiness; can no longer be

 fellowcitizens of one great, respectable, and flourishing empire.

 Hearken not to the voice which petulantly tells you that the form

 of government recommended for your adoption is a novelty in the

 political world; that it has never yet had a place in the theories

 of the wildest projectors; that it rashly attempts what it is

 impossible to accomplish. No, my countrymen, shut your ears against

 this unhallowed language. Shut your hearts against the poison which

 it conveys; the kindred blood which flows in the veins of American

 citizens, the mingled blood which they have shed in defense of their

 sacred rights, consecrate their Union, and excite horror at the idea

 of their becoming aliens, rivals, enemies. And if novelties are to

 be shunned, believe me, the most alarming of all novelties, the most

 wild of all projects, the most rash of all attempts, is that of

 rendering us in pieces, in order to preserve our liberties and

 promote our happiness. But why is the experiment of an extended

 republic to be rejected, merely because it may comprise what is new?

 Is it not the glory of the people of America, that, whilst they

 have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other

 nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity,

 for custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their own

 good sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of

 their own experience? To this manly spirit, posterity will be

 indebted for the possession, and the world for the example, of the

 numerous innovations displayed on the American theatre, in favor of

 private rights and public happiness. Had no important step been

 taken by the leaders of the Revolution for which a precedent could

 not be discovered, no government established of which an exact model

 did not present itself, the people of the United States might, at

 this moment have been numbered among the melancholy victims of

 misguided councils, must at best have been laboring under the weight

 of some of those forms which have crushed the liberties of the rest

 of mankind. Happily for America, happily, we trust, for the whole

 human race, they pursued a new and more noble course. They

 accomplished a revolution which has no parallel in the annals of

 human society. They reared the fabrics of governments which have no

 model on the face of the globe. They formed the design of a great

 Confederacy, which it is incumbent on their successors to improve

 and perpetuate. If their works betray imperfections, we wonder at

 the fewness of them. If they erred most in the structure of the

 Union, this was the work most difficult to be executed; this is the

 work which has been new modelled by the act of your convention, and

 it is that act on which you are now to deliberate and to decide.

PUBLIUS.

FEDERALIST No. 15

The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the

 Union

For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York.

IN THE course of the preceding papers, I have endeavored, my

 fellow-citizens, to place before you, in a clear and convincing

 light, the importance of Union to your political safety and

 happiness. I have unfolded to you a complication of dangers to

 which you would be exposed, should you permit that sacred knot which

 binds the people of America together be severed or dissolved by

 ambition or by avarice, by jealousy or by misrepresentation. In the

 sequel of the inquiry through which I propose to accompany you, the

 truths intended to be inculcated will receive further confirmation

 from facts and arguments hitherto unnoticed. If the road over which

 you will still have to pass should in some places appear to you

 tedious or irksome, you will recollect that you are in quest of

 information on a subject the most momentous which can engage the

 attention of a free people, that the field through which you have to

 travel is in itself spacious, and that the difficulties of the

 journey have been unnecessarily increased by the mazes with which

 sophistry has beset the way. It will be my aim to remove the

 obstacles from your progress in as compendious a manner as it can be

 done, without sacrificing utility to despatch.

In pursuance of the plan which I have laid down for the

 discussion of the subject, the point next in order to be examined is

 the ``insufficiency of the present Confederation to the preservation

 of the Union.'' It may perhaps be asked what need there is of

 reasoning or proof to illustrate a position which is not either

 controverted or doubted, to which the understandings and feelings of

 all classes of men assent, and which in substance is admitted by the

 opponents as well as by the friends of the new Constitution. It

 must in truth be acknowledged that, however these may differ in

 other respects, they in general appear to harmonize in this

 sentiment, at least, that there are material imperfections in our

 national system, and that something is necessary to be done to

 rescue us from impending anarchy. The facts that support this

 opinion are no longer objects of speculation. They have forced

 themselves upon the sensibility of the people at large, and have at

 length extorted from those, whose mistaken policy has had the

 principal share in precipitating the extremity at which we are

 arrived, a reluctant confession of the reality of those defects in

 the scheme of our federal government, which have been long pointed

 out and regretted by the intelligent friends of the Union.

We may indeed with propriety be said to have reached almost the

 last stage of national humiliation. There is scarcely anything that

 can wound the pride or degrade the character of an independent

 nation which we do not experience. Are there engagements to the

 performance of which we are held by every tie respectable among men?

 These are the subjects of constant and unblushing violation. Do we

 owe debts to foreigners and to our own citizens contracted in a time

 of imminent peril for the preservation of our political existence?

 These remain without any proper or satisfactory provision for their

 discharge. Have we valuable territories and important posts in the

 possession of a foreign power which, by express stipulations, ought

 long since to have been surrendered? These are still retained, to

 the prejudice of our interests, not less than of our rights. Are we

 in a condition to resent or to repel the aggression? We have

 neither troops, nor treasury, nor government.1 Are we even in a

 condition to remonstrate with dignity? The just imputations on our

 own faith, in respect to the same treaty, ought first to be removed.

 Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free participation in

 the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain excludes us from it. Is

 public credit an indispensable resource in time of public danger?

 We seem to have abandoned its cause as desperate and irretrievable.

 Is commerce of importance to national wealth? Ours is at the

 lowest point of declension. Is respectability in the eyes of

 foreign powers a safeguard against foreign encroachments? The

 imbecility of our government even forbids them to treat with us.

 Our ambassadors abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty.

 Is a violent and unnatural decrease in the value of land a symptom

 of national distress? The price of improved land in most parts of

 the country is much lower than can be accounted for by the quantity

 of waste land at market, and can only be fully explained by that

 want of private and public confidence, which are so alarmingly

 prevalent among all ranks, and which have a direct tendency to

 depreciate property of every kind. Is private credit the friend and

 patron of industry? That most useful kind which relates to

 borrowing and lending is reduced within the narrowest limits, and

 this still more from an opinion of insecurity than from the scarcity

 of money. To shorten an enumeration of particulars which can afford

 neither pleasure nor instruction, it may in general be demanded,

 what indication is there of national disorder, poverty, and

 insignificance that could befall a community so peculiarly blessed

 with natural advantages as we are, which does not form a part of the

 dark catalogue of our public misfortunes?

This is the melancholy situation to which we have been brought

 by those very maxims and councils which would now deter us from

 adopting the proposed Constitution; and which, not content with

 having conducted us to the brink of a precipice, seem resolved to

 plunge us into the abyss that awaits us below. Here, my countrymen,

 impelled by every motive that ought to influence an enlightened

 people, let us make a firm stand for our safety, our tranquillity,

 our dignity, our reputation. Let us at last break the fatal charm

 which has too long seduced us from the paths of felicity and

 prosperity.

It is true, as has been before observed that facts, too stubborn

 to be resisted, have produced a species of general assent to the

 abstract proposition that there exist material defects in our

 national system; but the usefulness of the concession, on the part

 of the old adversaries of federal measures, is destroyed by a

 strenuous opposition to a remedy, upon the only principles that can

 give it a chance of success. While they admit that the government

 of the United States is destitute of energy, they contend against

 conferring upon it those powers which are requisite to supply that

 energy. They seem still to aim at things repugnant and

 irreconcilable; at an augmentation of federal authority, without a

 diminution of State authority; at sovereignty in the Union, and

 complete independence in the members. They still, in fine, seem to

 cherish with blind devotion the political monster of an imperium

 in imperio. This renders a full display of the principal defects

 of the Confederation necessary, in order to show that the evils we

 experience do not proceed from minute or partial imperfections, but

 from fundamental errors in the structure of the building, which

 cannot be amended otherwise than by an alteration in the first

 principles and main pillars of the fabric.

The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing

 Confederation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or

 GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as

 contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of which they consist.

 Though this principle does not run through all the powers delegated

 to the Union, yet it pervades and governs those on which the

 efficacy of the rest depends. Except as to the rule of appointment,

 the United States has an indefinite discretion to make requisitions

 for men and money; but they have no authority to raise either, by

 regulations extending to the individual citizens of America. The

 consequence of this is, that though in theory their resolutions

 concerning those objects are laws, constitutionally binding on the

 members of the Union, yet in practice they are mere recommendations

 which the States observe or disregard at their option.

It is a singular instance of the capriciousness of the human

 mind, that after all the admonitions we have had from experience on

 this head, there should still be found men who object to the new

 Constitution, for deviating from a principle which has been found

 the bane of the old, and which is in itself evidently incompatible

 with the idea of GOVERNMENT; a principle, in short, which, if it is

 to be executed at all, must substitute the violent and sanguinary

 agency of the sword to the mild influence of the magistracy.

There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league

 or alliance between independent nations for certain defined purposes

 precisely stated in a treaty regulating all the details of time,

 place, circumstance, and quantity; leaving nothing to future

 discretion; and depending for its execution on the good faith of

 the parties. Compacts of this kind exist among all civilized

 nations, subject to the usual vicissitudes of peace and war, of

 observance and non-observance, as the interests or passions of the

 contracting powers dictate. In the early part of the present

 century there was an epidemical rage in Europe for this species of

 compacts, from which the politicians of the times fondly hoped for

 benefits which were never realized. With a view to establishing the

 equilibrium of power and the peace of that part of the world, all

 the resources of negotiation were exhausted, and triple and

 quadruple alliances were formed; but they were scarcely formed

 before they were broken, giving an instructive but afflicting lesson

 to mankind, how little dependence is to be placed on treaties which

 have no other sanction than the obligations of good faith, and which

 oppose general considerations of peace and justice to the impulse of

 any immediate interest or passion.

If the particular States in this country are disposed to stand

 in a similar relation to each other, and to drop the project of a

 general DISCRETIONARY SUPERINTENDENCE, the scheme would indeed be

 pernicious, and would entail upon us all the mischiefs which have

 been enumerated under the first head; but it would have the merit

 of being, at least, consistent and practicable Abandoning all views

 towards a confederate government, this would bring us to a simple

 alliance offensive and defensive; and would place us in a situation

 to be alternate friends and enemies of each other, as our mutual

 jealousies and rivalships, nourished by the intrigues of foreign

 nations, should prescribe to us.

But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation;

 if we still will adhere to the design of a national government, or,

 which is the same thing, of a superintending power, under the

 direction of a common council, we must resolve to incorporate into

 our plan those ingredients which may be considered as forming the

 characteristic difference between a league and a government; we

 must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the

 citizens, --the only proper objects of government.

Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to

 the idea of a law, that it be attended with a sanction; or, in

 other words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience. If there be

 no penalty annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or commands

 which pretend to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more than

 advice or recommendation. This penalty, whatever it may be, can

 only be inflicted in two ways: by the agency of the courts and

 ministers of justice, or by military force; by the COERCION of the

 magistracy, or by the COERCION of arms. The first kind can

 evidently apply only to men; the last kind must of necessity, be

 employed against bodies politic, or communities, or States. It is

 evident that there is no process of a court by which the observance

 of the laws can, in the last resort, be enforced. Sentences may be

 denounced against them for violations of their duty; but these

 sentences can only be carried into execution by the sword. In an

 association where the general authority is confined to the

 collective bodies of the communities, that compose it, every breach

 of the laws must involve a state of war; and military execution

 must become the only instrument of civil obedience. Such a state of

 things can certainly not deserve the name of government, nor would

 any prudent man choose to commit his happiness to it.

There was a time when we were told that breaches, by the States,

 of the regulations of the federal authority were not to be expected;

 that a sense of common interest would preside over the conduct of

 the respective members, and would beget a full compliance with all

 the constitutional requisitions of the Union. This language, at the

 present day, would appear as wild as a great part of what we now

 hear from the same quarter will be thought, when we shall have

 received further lessons from that best oracle of wisdom, experience.

 It at all times betrayed an ignorance of the true springs by which

 human conduct is actuated, and belied the original inducements to

 the establishment of civil power. Why has government been

 instituted at all? Because the passions of men will not conform to

 the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint. Has it been

 found that bodies of men act with more rectitude or greater

 disinterestedness than individuals? The contrary of this has been

 inferred by all accurate observers of the conduct of mankind; and

 the inference is founded upon obvious reasons. Regard to reputation

 has a less active influence, when the infamy of a bad action is to

 be divided among a number than when it is to fall singly upon one.

 A spirit of faction, which is apt to mingle its poison in the

 deliberations of all bodies of men, will often hurry the persons of

 whom they are composed into improprieties and excesses, for which

 they would blush in a private capacity.

In addition to all this, there is, in the nature of sovereign

 power, an impatience of control, that disposes those who are

 invested with the exercise of it, to look with an evil eye upon all

 external attempts to restrain or direct its operations. From this

 spirit it happens, that in every political association which is

 formed upon the principle of uniting in a common interest a number

 of lesser sovereignties, there will be found a kind of eccentric

 tendency in the subordinate or inferior orbs, by the operation of

 which there will be a perpetual effort in each to fly off from the

 common centre. This tendency is not difficult to be accounted for.

 It has its origin in the love of power. Power controlled or

 abridged is almost always the rival and enemy of that power by which

 it is controlled or abridged. This simple proposition will teach us

 how little reason there is to expect, that the persons intrusted

 with the administration of the affairs of the particular members of

 a confederacy will at all times be ready, with perfect good-humor,

 and an unbiased regard to the public weal, to execute the

 resolutions or decrees of the general authority. The reverse of

 this results from the constitution of human nature.

If, therefore, the measures of the Confederacy cannot be

 executed without the intervention of the particular administrations,

 there will be little prospect of their being executed at all. The

 rulers of the respective members, whether they have a constitutional

 right to do it or not, will undertake to judge of the propriety of

 the measures themselves. They will consider the conformity of the

 thing proposed or required to their immediate interests or aims;

 the momentary conveniences or inconveniences that would attend its

 adoption. All this will be done; and in a spirit of interested and

 suspicious scrutiny, without that knowledge of national

 circumstances and reasons of state, which is essential to a right

 judgment, and with that strong predilection in favor of local

 objects, which can hardly fail to mislead the decision. The same

 process must be repeated in every member of which the body is

 constituted; and the execution of the plans, framed by the councils

 of the whole, will always fluctuate on the discretion of the

 ill-informed and prejudiced opinion of every part. Those who have

 been conversant in the proceedings of popular assemblies; who have

 seen how difficult it often is, where there is no exterior pressure

 of circumstances, to bring them to harmonious resolutions on

 important points, will readily conceive how impossible it must be to

 induce a number of such assemblies, deliberating at a distance from

 each other, at different times, and under different impressions,

 long to co-operate in the same views and pursuits.

In our case, the concurrence of thirteen distinct sovereign

 wills is requisite, under the Confederation, to the complete

 execution of every important measure that proceeds from the Union.

 It has happened as was to have been foreseen. The measures of the

 Union have not been executed; the delinquencies of the States have,

 step by step, matured themselves to an extreme, which has, at

 length, arrested all the wheels of the national government, and

 brought them to an awful stand. Congress at this time scarcely

 possess the means of keeping up the forms of administration, till

 the States can have time to agree upon a more substantial substitute

 for the present shadow of a federal government. Things did not come

 to this desperate extremity at once. The causes which have been

 specified produced at first only unequal and disproportionate

 degrees of compliance with the requisitions of the Union. The

 greater deficiencies of some States furnished the pretext of example

 and the temptation of interest to the complying, or to the least

 delinquent States. Why should we do more in proportion than those

 who are embarked with us in the same political voyage? Why should

 we consent to bear more than our proper share of the common burden?

 These were suggestions which human selfishness could not withstand,

 and which even speculative men, who looked forward to remote

 consequences, could not, without hesitation, combat. Each State,

 yielding to the persuasive voice of immediate interest or

 convenience, has successively withdrawn its support, till the frail

 and tottering edifice seems ready to fall upon our heads, and to

 crush us beneath its ruins.

PUBLIUS.

1 ``I mean for the Union.''

FEDERALIST No. 16

The Same Subject Continued

(The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the

 Union)

From the New York Packet.

Tuesday, December 4, 1787.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE tendency of the principle of legislation for States, or

 communities, in their political capacities, as it has been

 exemplified by the experiment we have made of it, is equally

 attested by the events which have befallen all other governments of

 the confederate kind, of which we have any account, in exact

 proportion to its prevalence in those systems. The confirmations of

 this fact will be worthy of a distinct and particular examination.

 I shall content myself with barely observing here, that of all the

 confederacies of antiquity, which history has handed down to us, the

 Lycian and Achaean leagues, as far as there remain vestiges of them,

 appear to have been most free from the fetters of that mistaken

 principle, and were accordingly those which have best deserved, and

 have most liberally received, the applauding suffrages of political

 writers.

This exceptionable principle may, as truly as emphatically, be

 styled the parent of anarchy: It has been seen that delinquencies

 in the members of the Union are its natural and necessary offspring;

 and that whenever they happen, the only constitutional remedy is

 force, and the immediate effect of the use of it, civil war.

It remains to inquire how far so odious an engine of government,

 in its application to us, would even be capable of answering its end.

 If there should not be a large army constantly at the disposal of

 the national government it would either not be able to employ force

 at all, or, when this could be done, it would amount to a war

 between parts of the Confederacy concerning the infractions of a

 league, in which the strongest combination would be most likely to

 prevail, whether it consisted of those who supported or of those who

 resisted the general authority. It would rarely happen that the

 delinquency to be redressed would be confined to a single member,

 and if there were more than one who had neglected their duty,

 similarity of situation would induce them to unite for common

 defense. Independent of this motive of sympathy, if a large and

 influential State should happen to be the aggressing member, it

 would commonly have weight enough with its neighbors to win over

 some of them as associates to its cause. Specious arguments of

 danger to the common liberty could easily be contrived; plausible

 excuses for the deficiencies of the party could, without difficulty,

 be invented to alarm the apprehensions, inflame the passions, and

 conciliate the good-will, even of those States which were not

 chargeable with any violation or omission of duty. This would be

 the more likely to take place, as the delinquencies of the larger

 members might be expected sometimes to proceed from an ambitious

 premeditation in their rulers, with a view to getting rid of all

 external control upon their designs of personal aggrandizement; the

 better to effect which it is presumable they would tamper beforehand

 with leading individuals in the adjacent States. If associates

 could not be found at home, recourse would be had to the aid of

 foreign powers, who would seldom be disinclined to encouraging the

 dissensions of a Confederacy, from the firm union of which they had

 so much to fear. When the sword is once drawn, the passions of men

 observe no bounds of moderation. The suggestions of wounded pride,

 the instigations of irritated resentment, would be apt to carry the

 States against which the arms of the Union were exerted, to any

 extremes necessary to avenge the affront or to avoid the disgrace of

 submission. The first war of this kind would probably terminate in

 a dissolution of the Union.

This may be considered as the violent death of the Confederacy.

 Its more natural death is what we now seem to be on the point of

 experiencing, if the federal system be not speedily renovated in a

 more substantial form. It is not probable, considering the genius

 of this country, that the complying States would often be inclined

 to support the authority of the Union by engaging in a war against

 the non-complying States. They would always be more ready to pursue

 the milder course of putting themselves upon an equal footing with

 the delinquent members by an imitation of their example. And the

 guilt of all would thus become the security of all. Our past

 experience has exhibited the operation of this spirit in its full

 light. There would, in fact, be an insuperable difficulty in

 ascertaining when force could with propriety be employed. In the

 article of pecuniary contribution, which would be the most usual

 source of delinquency, it would often be impossible to decide

 whether it had proceeded from disinclination or inability. The

 pretense of the latter would always be at hand. And the case must

 be very flagrant in which its fallacy could be detected with

 sufficient certainty to justify the harsh expedient of compulsion.

 It is easy to see that this problem alone, as often as it should

 occur, would open a wide field for the exercise of factious views,

 of partiality, and of oppression, in the majority that happened to

 prevail in the national council.

It seems to require no pains to prove that the States ought not

 to prefer a national Constitution which could only be kept in motion

 by the instrumentality of a large army continually on foot to

 execute the ordinary requisitions or decrees of the government. And

 yet this is the plain alternative involved by those who wish to deny

 it the power of extending its operations to individuals. Such a

 scheme, if practicable at all, would instantly degenerate into a

 military despotism; but it will be found in every light

 impracticable. The resources of the Union would not be equal to the

 maintenance of an army considerable enough to confine the larger

 States within the limits of their duty; nor would the means ever be

 furnished of forming such an army in the first instance. Whoever

 considers the populousness and strength of several of these States

 singly at the present juncture, and looks forward to what they will

 become, even at the distance of half a century, will at once dismiss

 as idle and visionary any scheme which aims at regulating their

 movements by laws to operate upon them in their collective

 capacities, and to be executed by a coercion applicable to them in

 the same capacities. A project of this kind is little less romantic

 than the monster-taming spirit which is attributed to the fabulous

 heroes and demi-gods of antiquity.

Even in those confederacies which have been composed of members

 smaller than many of our counties, the principle of legislation for

 sovereign States, supported by military coercion, has never been

 found effectual. It has rarely been attempted to be employed, but

 against the weaker members; and in most instances attempts to

 coerce the refractory and disobedient have been the signals of

 bloody wars, in which one half of the confederacy has displayed its

 banners against the other half.

The result of these observations to an intelligent mind must be

 clearly this, that if it be possible at any rate to construct a

 federal government capable of regulating the common concerns and

 preserving the general tranquillity, it must be founded, as to the

 objects committed to its care, upon the reverse of the principle

 contended for by the opponents of the proposed Constitution. It

 must carry its agency to the persons of the citizens. It must stand

 in need of no intermediate legislations; but must itself be

 empowered to employ the arm of the ordinary magistrate to execute

 its own resolutions. The majesty of the national authority must be

 manifested through the medium of the courts of justice. The

 government of the Union, like that of each State, must be able to

 address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of individuals;

 and to attract to its support those passions which have the

 strongest influence upon the human heart. It must, in short,

 possess all the means, and have aright to resort to all the methods,

 of executing the powers with which it is intrusted, that are

 possessed and exercised by the government of the particular States.

To this reasoning it may perhaps be objected, that if any State

 should be disaffected to the authority of the Union, it could at any

 time obstruct the execution of its laws, and bring the matter to the

 same issue of force, with the necessity of which the opposite scheme

 is reproached.

The pausibility of this objection will vanish the moment we

 advert to the essential difference between a mere NON-COMPLIANCE and

 a DIRECT and ACTIVE RESISTANCE. If the interposition of the State

 legislatures be necessary to give effect to a measure of the Union,

 they have only NOT TO ACT, or to ACT EVASIVELY, and the measure is

 defeated. This neglect of duty may be disguised under affected but

 unsubstantial provisions, so as not to appear, and of course not to

 excite any alarm in the people for the safety of the Constitution.

 The State leaders may even make a merit of their surreptitious

 invasions of it on the ground of some temporary convenience,

 exemption, or advantage.

But if the execution of the laws of the national government

 should not require the intervention of the State legislatures, if

 they were to pass into immediate operation upon the citizens

 themselves, the particular governments could not interrupt their

 progress without an open and violent exertion of an unconstitutional

 power. No omissions nor evasions would answer the end. They would

 be obliged to act, and in such a manner as would leave no doubt that

 they had encroached on the national rights. An experiment of this

 nature would always be hazardous in the face of a constitution in

 any degree competent to its own defense, and of a people enlightened

 enough to distinguish between a legal exercise and an illegal

 usurpation of authority. The success of it would require not merely

 a factious majority in the legislature, but the concurrence of the

 courts of justice and of the body of the people. If the judges were

 not embarked in a conspiracy with the legislature, they would

 pronounce the resolutions of such a majority to be contrary to the

 supreme law of the land, unconstitutional, and void. If the people

 were not tainted with the spirit of their State representatives,

 they, as the natural guardians of the Constitution, would throw

 their weight into the national scale and give it a decided

 preponderancy in the contest. Attempts of this kind would not often

 be made with levity or rashness, because they could seldom be made

 without danger to the authors, unless in cases of a tyrannical

 exercise of the federal authority.

If opposition to the national government should arise from the

 disorderly conduct of refractory or seditious individuals, it could

 be overcome by the same means which are daily employed against the

 same evil under the State governments. The magistracy, being

 equally the ministers of the law of the land, from whatever source

 it might emanate, would doubtless be as ready to guard the national

 as the local regulations from the inroads of private licentiousness.

 As to those partial commotions and insurrections, which sometimes

 disquiet society, from the intrigues of an inconsiderable faction,

 or from sudden or occasional illhumors that do not infect the great

 body of the community the general government could command more

 extensive resources for the suppression of disturbances of that kind

 than would be in the power of any single member. And as to those

 mortal feuds which, in certain conjunctures, spread a conflagration

 through a whole nation, or through a very large proportion of it,

 proceeding either from weighty causes of discontent given by the

 government or from the contagion of some violent popular paroxysm,

 they do not fall within any ordinary rules of calculation. When

 they happen, they commonly amount to revolutions and dismemberments

 of empire. No form of government can always either avoid or control

 them. It is in vain to hope to guard against events too mighty for

 human foresight or precaution, and it would be idle to object to a

 government because it could not perform impossibilities.

PUBLIUS.

FEDERALIST No. 17

The Same Subject Continued

(The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the

 Union)

For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

AN OBJECTION, of a nature different from that which has been

 stated and answered, in my last address, may perhaps be likewise

 urged against the principle of legislation for the individual

 citizens of America. It may be said that it would tend to render

 the government of the Union too powerful, and to enable it to absorb

 those residuary authorities, which it might be judged proper to

 leave with the States for local purposes. Allowing the utmost

 latitude to the love of power which any reasonable man can require,

 I confess I am at a loss to discover what temptation the persons

 intrusted with the administration of the general government could

 ever feel to divest the States of the authorities of that

 description. The regulation of the mere domestic police of a State

 appears to me to hold out slender allurements to ambition.

 Commerce, finance, negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all the

 objects which have charms for minds governed by that passion; and

 all the powers necessary to those objects ought, in the first

 instance, to be lodged in the national depository. The

 administration of private justice between the citizens of the same

 State, the supervision of agriculture and of other concerns of a

 similar nature, all those things, in short, which are proper to be

 provided for by local legislation, can never be desirable cares of a

 general jurisdiction. It is therefore improbable that there should

 exist a disposition in the federal councils to usurp the powers with

 which they are connected; because the attempt to exercise those

 powers would be as troublesome as it would be nugatory; and the

 possession of them, for that reason, would contribute nothing to the

 dignity, to the importance, or to the splendor of the national

 government.

But let it be admitted, for argument's sake, that mere

 wantonness and lust of domination would be sufficient to beget that

 disposition; still it may be safely affirmed, that the sense of the

 constituent body of the national representatives, or, in other

 words, the people of the several States, would control the

 indulgence of so extravagant an appetite. It will always be far

 more easy for the State governments to encroach upon the national

 authorities than for the national government to encroach upon the

 State authorities. The proof of this proposition turns upon the

 greater degree of influence which the State governments if they

 administer their affairs with uprightness and prudence, will

 generally possess over the people; a circumstance which at the same

 time teaches us that there is an inherent and intrinsic weakness in

 all federal constitutions; and that too much pains cannot be taken

 in their organization, to give them all the force which is

 compatible with the principles of liberty.

The superiority of influence in favor of the particular

 governments would result partly from the diffusive construction of

 the national government, but chiefly from the nature of the objects

 to which the attention of the State administrations would be

 directed.

It is a known fact in human nature, that its affections are

 commonly weak in proportion to the distance or diffusiveness of the

 object. Upon the same principle that a man is more attached to his

 family than to his neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the

 community at large, the people of each State would be apt to feel a

 stronger bias towards their local governments than towards the

 government of the Union; unless the force of that principle should

 be destroyed by a much better administration of the latter.

This strong propensity of the human heart would find powerful

 auxiliaries in the objects of State regulation.

The variety of more minute interests, which will necessarily

 fall under the superintendence of the local administrations, and

 which will form so many rivulets of influence, running through every

 part of the society, cannot be particularized, without involving a

 detail too tedious and uninteresting to compensate for the

 instruction it might afford.

There is one transcendant advantage belonging to the province of

 the State governments, which alone suffices to place the matter in a

 clear and satisfactory light,--I mean the ordinary administration of

 criminal and civil justice. This, of all others, is the most

 powerful, most universal, and most attractive source of popular

 obedience and attachment. It is that which, being the immediate and

 visible guardian of life and property, having its benefits and its

 terrors in constant activity before the public eye, regulating all

 those personal interests and familiar concerns to which the

 sensibility of individuals is more immediately awake, contributes,

 more than any other circumstance, to impressing upon the minds of

 the people, affection, esteem, and reverence towards the government.

 This great cement of society, which will diffuse itself almost

 wholly through the channels of the particular governments,

 independent of all other causes of influence, would insure them so

 decided an empire over their respective citizens as to render them

 at all times a complete counterpoise, and, not unfrequently,

 dangerous rivals to the power of the Union.

The operations of the national government, on the other hand,

 falling less immediately under the observation of the mass of the

 citizens, the benefits derived from it will chiefly be perceived and

 attended to by speculative men. Relating to more general interests,

 they will be less apt to come home to the feelings of the people;

 and, in proportion, less likely to inspire an habitual sense of

 obligation, and an active sentiment of attachment.

The reasoning on this head has been abundantly exemplified by

 the experience of all federal constitutions with which we are

 acquainted, and of all others which have borne the least analogy to

 them.

Though the ancient feudal systems were not, strictly speaking,

 confederacies, yet they partook of the nature of that species of

 association. There was a common head, chieftain, or sovereign,

 whose authority extended over the whole nation; and a number of

 subordinate vassals, or feudatories, who had large portions of land

 allotted to them, and numerous trains of INFERIOR vassals or

 retainers, who occupied and cultivated that land upon the tenure of

 fealty or obedience, to the persons of whom they held it. Each

 principal vassal was a kind of sovereign, within his particular

 demesnes. The consequences of this situation were a continual

 opposition to authority of the sovereign, and frequent wars between

 the great barons or chief feudatories themselves. The power of the

 head of the nation was commonly too weak, either to preserve the

 public peace, or to protect the people against the oppressions of

 their immediate lords. This period of European affairs is

 emphatically styled by historians, the times of feudal anarchy.

When the sovereign happened to be a man of vigorous and warlike

 temper and of superior abilities, he would acquire a personal weight

 and influence, which answered, for the time, the purpose of a more

 regular authority. But in general, the power of the barons

 triumphed over that of the prince; and in many instances his

 dominion was entirely thrown off, and the great fiefs were erected

 into independent principalities or States. In those instances in

 which the monarch finally prevailed over his vassals, his success

 was chiefly owing to the tyranny of those vassals over their

 dependents. The barons, or nobles, equally the enemies of the

 sovereign and the oppressors of the common people, were dreaded and

 detested by both; till mutual danger and mutual interest effected a

 union between them fatal to the power of the aristocracy. Had the

 nobles, by a conduct of clemency and justice, preserved the fidelity

 and devotion of their retainers and followers, the contests between

 them and the prince must almost always have ended in their favor,

 and in the abridgment or subversion of the royal authority.

This is not an assertion founded merely in speculation or

 conjecture. Among other illustrations of its truth which might be

 cited, Scotland will furnish a cogent example. The spirit of

 clanship which was, at an early day, introduced into that kingdom,

 uniting the nobles and their dependants by ties equivalent to those

 of kindred, rendered the aristocracy a constant overmatch for the

 power of the monarch, till the incorporation with England subdued

 its fierce and ungovernable spirit, and reduced it within those

 rules of subordination which a more rational and more energetic

 system of civil polity had previously established in the latter

 kingdom.

The separate governments in a confederacy may aptly be compared

 with the feudal baronies; with this advantage in their favor, that

 from the reasons already explained, they will generally possess the

 confidence and good-will of the people, and with so important a

 support, will be able effectually to oppose all encroachments of the

 national government. It will be well if they are not able to

 counteract its legitimate and necessary authority. The points of

 similitude consist in the rivalship of power, applicable to both,

 and in the CONCENTRATION of large portions of the strength of the

 community into particular DEPOSITS, in one case at the disposal of

 individuals, in the other case at the disposal of political bodies.

A concise review of the events that have attended confederate

 governments will further illustrate this important doctrine; an

 inattention to which has been the great source of our political

 mistakes, and has given our jealousy a direction to the wrong side.

 This review shall form the subject of some ensuing papers.

PUBLIUS.

FEDERALIST No. 18

The Same Subject Continued

(The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the

 Union)

For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON AND MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:

AMONG the confederacies of antiquity, the most considerable was

 that of the Grecian republics, associated under the Amphictyonic

 council. From the best accounts transmitted of this celebrated

 institution, it bore a very instructive analogy to the present

 Confederation of the American States.

The members retained the character of independent and sovereign

 states, and had equal votes in the federal council. This council

 had a general authority to propose and resolve whatever it judged

 necessary for the common welfare of Greece; to declare and carry on

 war; to decide, in the last resort, all controversies between the

 members; to fine the aggressing party; to employ the whole force

 of the confederacy against the disobedient; to admit new members.

 The Amphictyons were the guardians of religion, and of the immense

 riches belonging to the temple of Delphos, where they had the right

 of jurisdiction in controversies between the inhabitants and those

 who came to consult the oracle. As a further provision for the

 efficacy of the federal powers, they took an oath mutually to defend

 and protect the united cities, to punish the violators of this oath,

 and to inflict vengeance on sacrilegious despoilers of the temple.

In theory, and upon paper, this apparatus of powers seems amply

 sufficient for all general purposes. In several material instances,

 they exceed the powers enumerated in the articles of confederation.

 The Amphictyons had in their hands the superstition of the times,

 one of the principal engines by which government was then

 maintained; they had a declared authority to use coercion against

 refractory cities, and were bound by oath to exert this authority on

 the necessary occasions.

Very different, nevertheless, was the experiment from the theory.

 The powers, like those of the present Congress, were administered

 by deputies appointed wholly by the cities in their political

 capacities; and exercised over them in the same capacities. Hence

 the weakness, the disorders, and finally the destruction of the

 confederacy. The more powerful members, instead of being kept in

 awe and subordination, tyrannized successively over all the rest.

 Athens, as we learn from Demosthenes, was the arbiter of Greece

 seventy-three years. The Lacedaemonians next governed it

 twenty-nine years; at a subsequent period, after the battle of

 Leuctra, the Thebans had their turn of domination.

It happened but too often, according to Plutarch, that the

 deputies of the strongest cities awed and corrupted those of the

 weaker; and that judgment went in favor of the most powerful party.

Even in the midst of defensive and dangerous wars with Persia

 and Macedon, the members never acted in concert, and were, more or

 fewer of them, eternally the dupes or the hirelings of the common

 enemy. The intervals of foreign war were filled up by domestic

 vicissitudes convulsions, and carnage.

After the conclusion of the war with Xerxes, it appears that the

 Lacedaemonians required that a number of the cities should be turned

 out of the confederacy for the unfaithful part they had acted. The

 Athenians, finding that the Lacedaemonians would lose fewer

 partisans by such a measure than themselves, and would become

 masters of the public deliberations, vigorously opposed and defeated

 the attempt. This piece of history proves at once the inefficiency

 of the union, the ambition and jealousy of its most powerful

 members, and the dependent and degraded condition of the rest. The

 smaller members, though entitled by the theory of their system to

 revolve in equal pride and majesty around the common center, had

 become, in fact, satellites of the orbs of primary magnitude.

Had the Greeks, says the Abbe Milot, been as wise as they were

 courageous, they would have been admonished by experience of the

 necessity of a closer union, and would have availed themselves of

 the peace which followed their success against the Persian arms, to

 establish such a reformation. Instead of this obvious policy,

 Athens and Sparta, inflated with the victories and the glory they

 had acquired, became first rivals and then enemies; and did each

 other infinitely more mischief than they had suffered from Xerxes.

 Their mutual jealousies, fears, hatreds, and injuries ended in the

 celebrated Peloponnesian war; which itself ended in the ruin and

 slavery of the Athenians who had begun it.

As a weak government, when not at war, is ever agitated by

 internal dissentions, so these never fail to bring on fresh

 calamities from abroad. The Phocians having ploughed up some

 consecrated ground belonging to the temple of Apollo, the

 Amphictyonic council, according to the superstition of the age,

 imposed a fine on the sacrilegious offenders. The Phocians, being

 abetted by Athens and Sparta, refused to submit to the decree. The

 Thebans, with others of the cities, undertook to maintain the

 authority of the Amphictyons, and to avenge the violated god. The

 latter, being the weaker party, invited the assistance of Philip of

 Macedon, who had secretly fostered the contest. Philip gladly

 seized the opportunity of executing the designs he had long planned

 against the liberties of Greece. By his intrigues and bribes he won

 over to his interests the popular leaders of several cities; by

 their influence and votes, gained admission into the Amphictyonic

 council; and by his arts and his arms, made himself master of the

 confederacy.

Such were the consequences of the fallacious principle on which

 this interesting establishment was founded. Had Greece, says a

 judicious observer on her fate, been united by a stricter

 confederation, and persevered in her union, she would never have

 worn the chains of Macedon; and might have proved a barrier to the

 vast projects of Rome.

The Achaean league, as it is called, was another society of

 Grecian republics, which supplies us with valuable instruction.

The Union here was far more intimate, and its organization much

 wiser, than in the preceding instance. It will accordingly appear,

 that though not exempt from a similar catastrophe, it by no means

 equally deserved it.

The cities composing this league retained their municipal

 jurisdiction, appointed their own officers, and enjoyed a perfect

 equality. The senate, in which they were represented, had the sole

 and exclusive right of peace and war; of sending and receiving

 ambassadors; of entering into treaties and alliances; of

 appointing a chief magistrate or praetor, as he was called, who

 commanded their armies, and who, with the advice and consent of ten

 of the senators, not only administered the government in the recess

 of the senate, but had a great share in its deliberations, when

 assembled. According to the primitive constitution, there were two

 praetors associated in the administration; but on trial a single

 one was preferred.

It appears that the cities had all the same laws and customs,

 the same weights and measures, and the same money. But how far this

 effect proceeded from the authority of the federal council is left

 in uncertainty. It is said only that the cities were in a manner

 compelled to receive the same laws and usages. When Lacedaemon was

 brought into the league by Philopoemen, it was attended with an

 abolition of the institutions and laws of Lycurgus, and an adoption

 of those of the Achaeans. The Amphictyonic confederacy, of which

 she had been a member, left her in the full exercise of her

 government and her legislation. This circumstance alone proves a

 very material difference in the genius of the two systems.

It is much to be regretted that such imperfect monuments remain

 of this curious political fabric. Could its interior structure and

 regular operation be ascertained, it is probable that more light

 would be thrown by it on the science of federal government, than by

 any of the like experiments with which we are acquainted.

One important fact seems to be witnessed by all the historians

 who take notice of Achaean affairs. It is, that as well after the

 renovation of the league by Aratus, as before its dissolution by the

 arts of Macedon, there was infinitely more of moderation and justice

 in the administration of its government, and less of violence and

 sedition in the people, than were to be found in any of the cities

 exercising SINGLY all the prerogatives of sovereignty. The Abbe

 Mably, in his observations on Greece, says that the popular

 government, which was so tempestuous elsewhere, caused no disorders

 in the members of the Achaean republic, BECAUSE IT WAS THERE

 TEMPERED BY THE GENERAL AUTHORITY AND LAWS OF THE CONFEDERACY.

We are not to conclude too hastily, however, that faction did

 not, in a certain degree, agitate the particular cities; much less

 that a due subordination and harmony reigned in the general system.

 The contrary is sufficiently displayed in the vicissitudes and fate

 of the republic.

Whilst the Amphictyonic confederacy remained, that of the

 Achaeans, which comprehended the less important cities only, made

 little figure on the theatre of Greece. When the former became a

 victim to Macedon, the latter was spared by the policy of Philip and

 Alexander. Under the successors of these princes, however, a

 different policy prevailed. The arts of division were practiced

 among the Achaeans. Each city was seduced into a separate interest;

 the union was dissolved. Some of the cities fell under the tyranny

 of Macedonian garrisons; others under that of usurpers springing

 out of their own confusions. Shame and oppression erelong awaken

 their love of liberty. A few cities reunited. Their example was

 followed by others, as opportunities were found of cutting off their

 tyrants. The league soon embraced almost the whole Peloponnesus.

 Macedon saw its progress; but was hindered by internal dissensions

 from stopping it. All Greece caught the enthusiasm and seemed ready

 to unite in one confederacy, when the jealousy and envy in Sparta

 and Athens, of the rising glory of the Achaeans, threw a fatal damp

 on the enterprise. The dread of the Macedonian power induced the

 league to court the alliance of the Kings of Egypt and Syria, who,

 as successors of Alexander, were rivals of the king of Macedon.

 This policy was defeated by Cleomenes, king of Sparta, who was led

 by his ambition to make an unprovoked attack on his neighbors, the

 Achaeans, and who, as an enemy to Macedon, had interest enough with

 the Egyptian and Syrian princes to effect a breach of their

 engagements with the league.

The Achaeans were now reduced to the dilemma of submitting to

 Cleomenes, or of supplicating the aid of Macedon, its former

 oppressor. The latter expedient was adopted. The contests of the

 Greeks always afforded a pleasing opportunity to that powerful

 neighbor of intermeddling in their affairs. A Macedonian army

 quickly appeared. Cleomenes was vanquished. The Achaeans soon

 experienced, as often happens, that a victorious and powerful ally

 is but another name for a master. All that their most abject

 compliances could obtain from him was a toleration of the exercise

 of their laws. Philip, who was now on the throne of Macedon, soon

 provoked by his tyrannies, fresh combinations among the Greeks. The

 Achaeans, though weakenened by internal dissensions and by the

 revolt of Messene, one of its members, being joined by the AEtolians

 and Athenians, erected the standard of opposition. Finding

 themselves, though thus supported, unequal to the undertaking, they

 once more had recourse to the dangerous expedient of introducing the

 succor of foreign arms. The Romans, to whom the invitation was

 made, eagerly embraced it. Philip was conquered; Macedon subdued.

 A new crisis ensued to the league. Dissensions broke out among it

 members. These the Romans fostered. Callicrates and other popular

 leaders became mercenary instruments for inveigling their countrymen.

 The more effectually to nourish discord and disorder the Romans

 had, to the astonishment of those who confided in their sincerity,

 already proclaimed universal liberty1 throughout Greece. With

 the same insidious views, they now seduced the members from the

 league, by representing to their pride the violation it committed on

 their sovereignty. By these arts this union, the last hope of

 Greece, the last hope of ancient liberty, was torn into pieces; and

 such imbecility and distraction introduced, that the arms of Rome

 found little difficulty in completing the ruin which their arts had

 commenced. The Achaeans were cut to pieces, and Achaia loaded with

 chains, under which it is groaning at this hour.

I have thought it not superfluous to give the outlines of this

 important portion of history; both because it teaches more than one

 lesson, and because, as a supplement to the outlines of the Achaean

 constitution, it emphatically illustrates the tendency of federal

 bodies rather to anarchy among the members, than to tyranny in the

 head.

PUBLIUS.

1 This was but another name more specious for the independence

 of the members on the federal head.

FEDERALIST No. 19

The Same Subject Continued

(The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the

 Union)

For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON AND MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE examples of ancient confederacies, cited in my last paper,

 have not exhausted the source of experimental instruction on this

 subject. There are existing institutions, founded on a similar

 principle, which merit particular consideration. The first which

 presents itself is the Germanic body.

In the early ages of Christianity, Germany was occupied by seven

 distinct nations, who had no common chief. The Franks, one of the

 number, having conquered the Gauls, established the kingdom which

 has taken its name from them. In the ninth century Charlemagne, its

 warlike monarch, carried his victorious arms in every direction;

 and Germany became a part of his vast dominions. On the

 dismemberment, which took place under his sons, this part was

 erected into a separate and independent empire. Charlemagne and his

 immediate descendants possessed the reality, as well as the ensigns

 and dignity of imperial power. But the principal vassals, whose

 fiefs had become hereditary, and who composed the national diets

 which Charlemagne had not abolished, gradually threw off the yoke

 and advanced to sovereign jurisdiction and independence. The force

 of imperial sovereignty was insufficient to restrain such powerful

 dependants; or to preserve the unity and tranquillity of the empire.

 The most furious private wars, accompanied with every species of

 calamity, were carried on between the different princes and states.

 The imperial authority, unable to maintain the public order,

 declined by degrees till it was almost extinct in the anarchy, which

 agitated the long interval between the death of the last emperor of

 the Suabian, and the accession of the first emperor of the Austrian

 lines. In the eleventh century the emperors enjoyed full

 sovereignty: In the fifteenth they had little more than the symbols

 and decorations of power.

Out of this feudal system, which has itself many of the

 important features of a confederacy, has grown the federal system

 which constitutes the Germanic empire. Its powers are vested in a

 diet representing the component members of the confederacy; in the

 emperor, who is the executive magistrate, with a negative on the

 decrees of the diet; and in the imperial chamber and the aulic

 council, two judiciary tribunals having supreme jurisdiction in

 controversies which concern the empire, or which happen among its

 members.

The diet possesses the general power of legislating for the

 empire; of making war and peace; contracting alliances; assessing

 quotas of troops and money; constructing fortresses; regulating

 coin; admitting new members; and subjecting disobedient members to

 the ban of the empire, by which the party is degraded from his

 sovereign rights and his possessions forfeited. The members of the

 confederacy are expressly restricted from entering into compacts

 prejudicial to the empire; from imposing tolls and duties on their

 mutual intercourse, without the consent of the emperor and diet;

 from altering the value of money; from doing injustice to one

 another; or from affording assistance or retreat to disturbers of

 the public peace. And the ban is denounced against such as shall

 violate any of these restrictions. The members of the diet, as

 such, are subject in all cases to be judged by the emperor and diet,

 and in their private capacities by the aulic council and imperial

 chamber.

The prerogatives of the emperor are numerous. The most

 important of them are: his exclusive right to make propositions to

 the diet; to negative its resolutions; to name ambassadors; to

 confer dignities and titles; to fill vacant electorates; to found

 universities; to grant privileges not injurious to the states of

 the empire; to receive and apply the public revenues; and

 generally to watch over the public safety. In certain cases, the

 electors form a council to him. In quality of emperor, he possesses

 no territory within the empire, nor receives any revenue for his

 support. But his revenue and dominions, in other qualities,

 constitute him one of the most powerful princes in Europe.

From such a parade of constitutional powers, in the

 representatives and head of this confederacy, the natural

 supposition would be, that it must form an exception to the general

 character which belongs to its kindred systems. Nothing would be

 further from the reality. The fundamental principle on which it

 rests, that the empire is a community of sovereigns, that the diet

 is a representation of sovereigns and that the laws are addressed to

 sovereigns, renders the empire a nerveless body, incapable of

 regulating its own members, insecure against external dangers, and

 agitated with unceasing fermentations in its own bowels.

The history of Germany is a history of wars between the emperor

 and the princes and states; of wars among the princes and states

 themselves; of the licentiousness of the strong, and the oppression

 of the weak; of foreign intrusions, and foreign intrigues; of

 requisitions of men and money disregarded, or partially complied

 with; of attempts to enforce them, altogether abortive, or attended

 with slaughter and desolation, involving the innocent with the

 guilty; of general inbecility, confusion, and misery.

In the sixteenth century, the emperor, with one part of the

 empire on his side, was seen engaged against the other princes and

 states. In one of the conflicts, the emperor himself was put to

 flight, and very near being made prisoner by the elector of Saxony.

 The late king of Prussia was more than once pitted against his

 imperial sovereign; and commonly proved an overmatch for him.

 Controversies and wars among the members themselves have been so

 common, that the German annals are crowded with the bloody pages

 which describe them. Previous to the peace of Westphalia, Germany

 was desolated by a war of thirty years, in which the emperor, with

 one half of the empire, was on one side, and Sweden, with the other

 half, on the opposite side. Peace was at length negotiated, and

 dictated by foreign powers; and the articles of it, to which

 foreign powers are parties, made a fundamental part of the Germanic

 constitution.

If the nation happens, on any emergency, to be more united by

 the necessity of self-defense, its situation is still deplorable.

 Military preparations must be preceded by so many tedious

 discussions, arising from the jealousies, pride, separate views, and

 clashing pretensions of sovereign bodies, that before the diet can

 settle the arrangements, the enemy are in the field; and before the

 federal troops are ready to take it, are retiring into winter

 quarters.

The small body of national troops, which has been judged

 necessary in time of peace, is defectively kept up, badly paid,

 infected with local prejudices, and supported by irregular and

 disproportionate contributions to the treasury.

The impossibility of maintaining order and dispensing justice

 among these sovereign subjects, produced the experiment of dividing

 the empire into nine or ten circles or districts; of giving them an

 interior organization, and of charging them with the military

 execution of the laws against delinquent and contumacious members.

 This experiment has only served to demonstrate more fully the

 radical vice of the constitution. Each circle is the miniature

 picture of the deformities of this political monster. They either

 fail to execute their commissions, or they do it with all the

 devastation and carnage of civil war. Sometimes whole circles are

 defaulters; and then they increase the mischief which they were

 instituted to remedy.

We may form some judgment of this scheme of military coercion

 from a sample given by Thuanus. In Donawerth, a free and imperial

 city of the circle of Suabia, the Abb 300 de St. Croix enjoyed

 certain immunities which had been reserved to him. In the exercise

 of these, on some public occasions, outrages were committed on him

 by the people of the city. The consequence was that the city was

 put under the ban of the empire, and the Duke of Bavaria, though

 director of another circle, obtained an appointment to enforce it.

 He soon appeared before the city with a corps of ten thousand

 troops, and finding it a fit occasion, as he had secretly intended

 from the beginning, to revive an antiquated claim, on the pretext

 that his ancestors had suffered the place to be dismembered from his

 territory,1 he took possession of it in his own name, disarmed,

 and punished the inhabitants, and reannexed the city to his domains.

It may be asked, perhaps, what has so long kept this disjointed

 machine from falling entirely to pieces? The answer is obvious:

 The weakness of most of the members, who are unwilling to expose

 themselves to the mercy of foreign powers; the weakness of most of

 the principal members, compared with the formidable powers all

 around them; the vast weight and influence which the emperor

 derives from his separate and heriditary dominions; and the

 interest he feels in preserving a system with which his family pride

 is connected, and which constitutes him the first prince in Europe;

 --these causes support a feeble and precarious Union; whilst the

 repellant quality, incident to the nature of sovereignty, and which

 time continually strengthens, prevents any reform whatever, founded

 on a proper consolidation. Nor is it to be imagined, if this

 obstacle could be surmounted, that the neighboring powers would

 suffer a revolution to take place which would give to the empire the

 force and preeminence to which it is entitled. Foreign nations have

 long considered themselves as interested in the changes made by

 events in this constitution; and have, on various occasions,

 betrayed their policy of perpetuating its anarchy and weakness.

If more direct examples were wanting, Poland, as a government

 over local sovereigns, might not improperly be taken notice of. Nor

 could any proof more striking be given of the calamities flowing

 from such institutions. Equally unfit for self-government and

 self-defense, it has long been at the mercy of its powerful

 neighbors; who have lately had the mercy to disburden it of one

 third of its people and territories.

The connection among the Swiss cantons scarcely amounts to a

 confederacy; though it is sometimes cited as an instance of the

 stability of such institutions.

They have no common treasury; no common troops even in war; no

 common coin; no common judicatory; nor any other common mark of

 sovereignty.

They are kept together by the peculiarity of their topographical

 position; by their individual weakness and insignificancy; by the

 fear of powerful neighbors, to one of which they were formerly

 subject; by the few sources of contention among a people of such

 simple and homogeneous manners; by their joint interest in their

 dependent possessions; by the mutual aid they stand in need of, for

 suppressing insurrections and rebellions, an aid expressly

 stipulated and often required and afforded; and by the necessity of

 some regular and permanent provision for accomodating disputes among

 the cantons. The provision is, that the parties at variance shall

 each choose four judges out of the neutral cantons, who, in case of

 disagreement, choose an umpire. This tribunal, under an oath of

 impartiality, pronounces definitive sentence, which all the cantons

 are bound to enforce. The competency of this regulation may be

 estimated by a clause in their treaty of 1683, with Victor Amadeus

 of Savoy; in which he obliges himself to interpose as mediator in

 disputes between the cantons, and to employ force, if necessary,

 against the contumacious party.

So far as the peculiarity of their case will admit of comparison

 with that of the United States, it serves to confirm the principle

 intended to be established. Whatever efficacy the union may have

 had in ordinary cases, it appears that the moment a cause of

 difference sprang up, capable of trying its strength, it failed.

 The controversies on the subject of religion, which in three

 instances have kindled violent and bloody contests, may be said, in

 fact, to have severed the league. The Protestant and Catholic

 cantons have since had their separate diets, where all the most

 important concerns are adjusted, and which have left the general

 diet little other business than to take care of the common bailages.

That separation had another consequence, which merits attention.

 It produced opposite alliances with foreign powers: of Berne, at

 the head of the Protestant association, with the United Provinces;

 and of Luzerne, at the head of the Catholic association, with

 France.

PUBLIUS.

1 Pfeffel, ``Nouvel Abreg. Chronol. de l'Hist., etc.,

 d'Allemagne,'' says the pretext was to indemnify himself for the

 expense of the expedition.

FEDERALIST No. 20

The Same Subject Continued

(The Insufficiency fo the Present Confederation to Preserve the

 Union)

From the New York Packet.

Tuesday, December 11, 1787.

HAMILTON AND MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE United Netherlands are a confederacy of republics, or rather

 of aristocracies of a very remarkable texture, yet confirming all

 the lessons derived from those which we have already reviewed.

The union is composed of seven coequal and sovereign states, and

 each state or province is a composition of equal and independent

 cities. In all important cases, not only the provinces but the

 cities must be unanimous.

The sovereignty of the Union is represented by the

 States-General, consisting usually of about fifty deputies appointed

 by the provinces. They hold their seats, some for life, some for

 six, three, and one years; from two provinces they continue in

 appointment during pleasure.

The States-General have authority to enter into treaties and

 alliances; to make war and peace; to raise armies and equip

 fleets; to ascertain quotas and demand contributions. In all these

 cases, however, unanimity and the sanction of their constituents are

 requisite. They have authority to appoint and receive ambassadors;

 to execute treaties and alliances already formed; to provide for

 the collection of duties on imports and exports; to regulate the

 mint, with a saving to the provincial rights; to govern as

 sovereigns the dependent territories. The provinces are restrained,

 unless with the general consent, from entering into foreign

 treaties; from establishing imposts injurious to others, or

 charging their neighbors with higher duties than their own subjects.

 A council of state, a chamber of accounts, with five colleges of

 admiralty, aid and fortify the federal administration.

The executive magistrate of the union is the stadtholder, who is

 now an hereditary prince. His principal weight and influence in the

 republic are derived from this independent title; from his great

 patrimonial estates; from his family connections with some of the

 chief potentates of Europe; and, more than all, perhaps, from his

 being stadtholder in the several provinces, as well as for the

 union; in which provincial quality he has the appointment of town

 magistrates under certain regulations, executes provincial decrees,

 presides when he pleases in the provincial tribunals, and has

 throughout the power of pardon.

As stadtholder of the union, he has, however, considerable

 prerogatives.

In his political capacity he has authority to settle disputes

 between the provinces, when other methods fail; to assist at the

 deliberations of the States-General, and at their particular

 conferences; to give audiences to foreign ambassadors, and to keep

 agents for his particular affairs at foreign courts.

In his military capacity he commands the federal troops,

 provides for garrisons, and in general regulates military affairs;

 disposes of all appointments, from colonels to ensigns, and of the

 governments and posts of fortified towns.

In his marine capacity he is admiral-general, and superintends

 and directs every thing relative to naval forces and other naval

 affairs; presides in the admiralties in person or by proxy;

 appoints lieutenant-admirals and other officers; and establishes

 councils of war, whose sentences are not executed till he approves

 them.

His revenue, exclusive of his private income, amounts to three

 hundred thousand florins. The standing army which he commands

 consists of about forty thousand men.

Such is the nature of the celebrated Belgic confederacy, as

 delineated on parchment. What are the characters which practice has

 stamped upon it? Imbecility in the government; discord among the

 provinces; foreign influence and indignities; a precarious

 existence in peace, and peculiar calamities from war.

It was long ago remarked by Grotius, that nothing but the hatred

 of his countrymen to the house of Austria kept them from being

 ruined by the vices of their constitution.

The union of Utrecht, says another respectable writer, reposes

 an authority in the States-General, seemingly sufficient to secure

 harmony, but the jealousy in each province renders the practice very

 different from the theory.

The same instrument, says another, obliges each province to levy

 certain contributions; but this article never could, and probably

 never will, be executed; because the inland provinces, who have

 little commerce, cannot pay an equal quota.

In matters of contribution, it is the practice to waive the

 articles of the constitution. The danger of delay obliges the

 consenting provinces to furnish their quotas, without waiting for

 the others; and then to obtain reimbursement from the others, by

 deputations, which are frequent, or otherwise, as they can. The

 great wealth and influence of the province of Holland enable her to

 effect both these purposes.

It has more than once happened, that the deficiencies had to be

 ultimately collected at the point of the bayonet; a thing

 practicable, though dreadful, in a confedracy where one of the

 members exceeds in force all the rest, and where several of them are

 too small to meditate resistance; but utterly impracticable in one

 composed of members, several of which are equal to each other in

 strength and resources, and equal singly to a vigorous and

 persevering defense.

Foreign ministers, says Sir William Temple, who was himself a

 foreign minister, elude matters taken ad referendum, by

 tampering with the provinces and cities. In 1726, the treaty of

 Hanover was delayed by these means a whole year. Instances of a

 like nature are numerous and notorious.

In critical emergencies, the States-General are often compelled

 to overleap their constitutional bounds. In 1688, they concluded a

 treaty of themselves at the risk of their heads. The treaty of

 Westphalia, in 1648, by which their independence was formerly and

 finally recognized, was concluded without the consent of Zealand.

 Even as recently as the last treaty of peace with Great Britain,

 the constitutional principle of unanimity was departed from. A weak

 constitution must necessarily terminate in dissolution, for want of

 proper powers, or the usurpation of powers requisite for the public

 safety. Whether the usurpation, when once begun, will stop at the

 salutary point, or go forward to the dangerous extreme, must depend

 on the contingencies of the moment. Tyranny has perhaps oftener

 grown out of the assumptions of power, called for, on pressing

 exigencies, by a defective constitution, than out of the full

 exercise of the largest constitutional authorities.

Notwithstanding the calamities produced by the stadtholdership,

 it has been supposed that without his influence in the individual

 provinces, the causes of anarchy manifest in the confederacy would

 long ago have dissolved it. ``Under such a government,'' says the

 Abbe Mably, ``the Union could never have subsisted, if the provinces

 had not a spring within themselves, capable of quickening their

 tardiness, and compelling them to the same way of thinking. This

 spring is the stadtholder.'' It is remarked by Sir William Temple,

 ``that in the intermissions of the stadtholdership, Holland, by her

 riches and her authority, which drew the others into a sort of

 dependence, supplied the place.''

These are not the only circumstances which have controlled the

 tendency to anarchy and dissolution. The surrounding powers impose

 an absolute necessity of union to a certain degree, at the same time

 that they nourish by their intrigues the constitutional vices which

 keep the republic in some degree always at their mercy.

The true patriots have long bewailed the fatal tendency of these

 vices, and have made no less than four regular experiments by

 EXTRAORDINARY ASSEMBLIES, convened for the special purpose, to apply

 a remedy. As many times has their laudable zeal found it impossible

 to UNITE THE PUBLIC COUNCILS in reforming the known, the

 acknowledged, the fatal evils of the existing constitution. Let us

 pause, my fellow-citizens, for one moment, over this melancholy and

 monitory lesson of history; and with the tear that drops for the